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Abstract 
This is the first part of a paper concerning intermediate propositional logics with the 
disjunction property which cannot be properly extended into logics of the same kind, and are 
therefore called maximul. To deal with these logics. we use a method based on the search of 
suitable nonsrundurd logics, which has an heuristic content and has allowed us to discover 
a wide family of logics, as well as to get their maximality proofs in a uniform way. The present 
part illustrates infinitely many maximal logics with the disjunction property extending the 
well-known logic of Scott, and aims to provide a first picture of the method, sufficient for the 
reuder who wish to achieve an overall undcrstnnding of it without entering into the further 
aspects developed in the second part. From this point of view, the latter will not be self- 
standing, but will be seen as a prosecution and a complement of the former. with the aim that 
the material presented in the whole paper can be used as a starting point for a classification of 
the subject. 
1. Introduction 
Since in both parts of this paper we will be interested only in intermediate 
propositional logics, we will use the term “logic” as synonimous with “intermediate 
propositional logic”. Also, we will call constructioe any logic with the disjunction 
property. 
The study of the maximal constructive logics originated from Lukasiewicz’s conjec- 
ture of 1952 [ 111, which pretended that intuitionistic logic was the greatest consistent 
and constructive propositional system closed under substitution and detachment. 
However, after the exhibition of the first counterexamples to the conjecture, due to 
Kreisel and Putnam and to Scott [lo], the notion of maximal constructive logic 
seemed to loose its foundational importance, and the interest of the researchers was 
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led to other questions. Various nonconstructive logics were discovered together with 
constructive ones, and the main concern was in developing eneral tools to study their 
semantical properties, independently of their being constructive or not. 
Yet, the motivation for a systematical analysis of the maximal constructive logics 
still remains. After all, the notion of constructive logic is important, and one expects 
that some features involved in this notion can be captured only at the level of 
maximality. 
Thus, after Kirk’s discovery that the greatest constructive logic does not exist [9], in 
the recent years the interest in the maximal constructive logics has considerably 
increased. In this frame, an investigation has been made on the number of these logics, 
which has turned out to be infinite [ 12,13,15]. The final result has been independently 
obtained by Chagrov [2], Galanter [S] and the authors [4], who have shown that the 
set of the maximal constructive logics has the power of continuum (in [4] a proof is 
also given that the set of the maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunc- 
tion property and the explicit definability property has the power of continuum). 
However, the majority of these researches has been carried out using indirect 
methods [ 15,2,4], i.e., by means of constructive incompatibility proofs. In this sense, 
two constructively incompatible logics are two constructive logics which cannot be 
simultaneously extended into a single constructive logic; also, by Zorn’s lemma every 
constructive logic can be extended into a maximal one, hence at least two maximal 
constructive logics exist for any two constructively incompatible logics. In [15] an 
effort is made of showing how such indirect existence proofs can provide some 
information on the structure of the set of the maximal logics. But a satisfactory 
knowledge of this set can be obtained only giving a direct characterization of many 
logics belonging to it. Now, despite the great abundance of maximal constructive 
logics, the only logic of this kind for which a semantical characterization has been 
given in literature is, as far as we know, Medvedev’s logic MV [6,12,14,15,3]. 
In this paper we will present infinitely many new maximal constructive logics, giving 
a Kripke style semantics for each of them. These results will be obtained by extending 
a method explained in [14], based on a characterization of the maximal constructive 
logics in terms of maximal nonstandard constructive logics. In [14] the method has 
been applied only to obtain a new proof of the maximality of MV, which was already 
known to be maximal; moreover, the semantics for MV there considered is close to 
Medvedev’s original one and is not Kripke style. But only in connection with Kripke 
semantics the method can be extensively applied in all its generality, as we do in the 
present paper. 
Let us better explain, now, the content of the paper and the criteria according to 
which the material is distributed. 
In the first part (i.e., the present one) we provide the general results upon which our 
method to get maximal constructive logics is based, together with a concrete illustra- 
tion of it, exhibiting a family of maximal constructive logics. Thus, together with the 
(standard) notion of logic, in the next section we will introduce, as in [14], the notion 
of nonstandard logic: this is any consistent set of formulas containing intuitionistic 
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logic and closed under detachment and restricted substitutions, the latter allowing to 
replace the variables only with negated formulas. We will be interested in the 
nonstandard constructive logics (i.e., nonstandard logics with the disjunction prop- 
erty) and in the maximal nonstandard constructive logics. For, as stated in [ 141, there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between the maximal nonstandard constructive logics 
and the maximal standard ones; and the problem of characterizing the latter can be 
reduced to the apparently simpler problem of characterizing the former. We will recall 
the main notions and results of [14] about this correspondence, which is the basis of 
our method. Successively, in Section 3, we will introduce a Kripke style semantics for 
particular nonstandard logics, including the maximal constructive ones. This seman- 
tics is quite similar to the usual one for standard logics, in terms of classes of frames 
(posets); the only difference is that in the case of nonstandard logics the forcing defined 
on the posets must satisfy special constraints (as compared with the constrained 
forcing, we can say that the forcing used for the standard logics is free). We will be 
interested in comparing semantical characterizations of standard and nonstandard 
logics, in particular in relating the characterizations of the maximal standard con- 
structive logics to the ones of the corresponding maximal nonstandard constructive 
logics. From this point of view, the examples we will provide in Section 6 (as well as 
the example presented in the second part) will involve cases where the same class of 
posets simultaneously defines a maximal nonstandard constructive logic and the 
corresponding maximal standard one, where constrained forcing is used for the first 
logic and free forcing is used for the second. Our method consists in the search of 
examples of this kind, and seems to be rather powerful. For, the cases where an 
underlying class of posets defines both a standard and a nonstandard constructive logic 
seem to be the most (if not all). Moreover, to find underlying classes of posets for 
maximal nonstandard constructive logics in general one has to look for classes of 
finite posets which are uniquely determined (according to some law) by thejinal states. 
Since the maximal nonstandard constructive logic associated with any maximal 
(standard) constructive logic is uniquely determined as the greatest nonstandard 
constructive logic (properly) extending it, a classification of the maximal nonstandard 
constructive logics indirectly becomes a classification of the maximal standard con- 
structive logics. In this sense, in Section 6 we wilLintroduce also the notion of 
constructive pseudologic, intended as a set of classically valid formulas closed under 
detachment (but not necessarily under any kind of substitution), and satisfying the 
disjunction property. This will allow us to divide the family of maximal nonstandard 
constructive logics presented in that section into two classes: the first class, illustrated 
by a single nonstandard logic, contains the maximal nonstandard constructive logics 
which are not maximal constructive pseudologics; the second class, illustrated by 
infinitely many examples, contains the nonstandard constructive logics which are 
maximal also in the greater context of the constructive pseudologics (the examples of 
the second class will include the maximal nonstandard constructive logic associated 
with Medvedev’s logic MV, which can be proved to be a maximal constructive 
pseudologic also starting from the results of [ 143). This distinction seems to be of some 
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interest, since it corresponds to important differences in the maximality proofs of the 
two kinds of nonstandard logics: in the maximality proofs of the logics of the second 
class we will treat the involved nonstandard constructive logics just as sets of 
classically valid formulas satisfying the disjunction property; on the other hand, in the 
maximality proof of the logic of the first class we will have to consider the involved 
nonstandard constructive logics as sets of classically valid formulas satisfying the 
disjunction property and closed with respect to certain substitutions. 
Other important aspects, besides the above quoted ones treated in Sections 2 and 3 and 
in Section 6 (which is the core of the present part), will be considered in Sections 4 and 5. 
Indeed, all the maximal constructive logics we will exhibit in Section 6 are exten- 
sions of the well-known logic ST of Scott [lo, 1,16,15,4], which is defined by adding 
to intuitionistic logic the axiom-schema ((-11 A + A) + A v 1 A) + 1 A v 11 A, 
whose instances are obtained by substitution from the formula in one variable 
((11 p -P p) + p v 1 p) + 1 p v 11 p. In Section 5 we will provide a Kripke seman- 
tics for ST and will prove the related soundness and completeness theorems. These 
results, which have been previously stated, without proof, in [ 151, may be considered 
interesting by themselves, ince they disprove a conjecture of Minari [16], according 
to which ST has no semantics in terms of Kripke frames. On the other hand, our 
semantical characterization of ST is the general framework within which the semanti- 
cal characterizations of the (so to speak) “scottian” maximal constructive logics of 
Section 6 will be defined, by means of progressive restrictions of the class of frames for 
ST (in a similar way, in the second part of the paper we will introduce a constructive 
logic which is constructively incompatible with ST and, in a sense which will be made 
precise, plays a role “alternative” to the one of ST; we will call AST, i.e. “anti” ST, such 
a logic and will present an example of “antiscottian” maximal constructive logic 
extending AST, whose Kripke semantics will be defined within the framework of 
a Kripke semantics for AST). 
The completeness theorem of Section 5, as well as the completeness theorems 
needed in Section 6 to get the desired maximality results (providing the axiomatiz- 
ations of the involved maximal nonstandard constructive logics, but not the axiomat- 
izations of the corresponding maximal standard ones), will require an appropriate 
filtration technique. In Section 4 we will explain Gabbay’s technique of the quotient 
models [S], which will be refined by means of suitable filtration formulas we will call 
extensively complete. The quotient models technique with extensively complete filtra- 
tion formulas will be sufficient o treat the logics and the nonstandard logics of the 
present part, while a more sophisticated technique will be introduced in the second 
part of the paper. 
The present part can also be seen as a self-standing paper which should allow the 
reader to grasp the main lines of our method to single out maximal constructive logics 
even disregarding the second part. On the other hand, the second part is intended as 
a prosecution and a complement of the first, presupposing its knowledge. 
In the second part we will deal with the above quoted logic AST, defined by adding 
to intuitionistic logic the axiom-schema (((11 A + A) + A v -I A) -+ 1 A v 
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1lA) --+llA v (11A + A), whose instances are obtained by substitution from 
the formula in one variable (((1~p+p)+Pv1P)+~Pv~~P)+ 
11 p v (11 p + p) (like ST, AST is one of the constructive logics taken into account 
in [l], whose superintuitionistic axiom-schemes are generated by formulas in one 
variable). We will introduce a Kripke semantics for AST, and will prove the related 
soundness and completeness theorems. We will also compare AST and ST on the 
basis of their fragments in one variable, which will be seen to be the only maximal 
constructive fragments in one variable (i.e., the fragment in one variable of any 
constructive logic is contained in ST or in AST). Moreover, we will show that there are 
maximal constructive logics which neither contain ST nor contain AST (i.e., they are 
neither “scottian” nor “antiscottian”; these logics, which we will not directly exhibit, 
cannot have maximal fragments in one variable). 
Despite the maximality of its fragment in one variable, the logic AST is not 
a maximal constructive one (just as it happens for ST). Thus, we will provide a further 
application of our method and will exhibit an “antiscottian” maximal constructive 
logic (whose corresponding maximal nonstandard constructive logic will turn out to 
be also a maximal constructive pseudo logic, in the sense discussed above). 
As compared with the analogous results given in the first part of the paper, the 
completeness theorem of AST and the completeness theorem needed to get the 
maximality of the “antiscottian” constructive logic (providing an axiomatization of 
the corresponding maximal nonstandard constructive logic, but not an axiomatiz- 
ation of the considered logic) involve more complex proofs, requiring (as anticipated 
above) a more sophisticated filtration technique. To this aim, we will introduce the 
selective models technique, which has been previously presented in [ 151 as a refine- 
ment of the technique of Gabbay and de Jongh [7]; differently from [lS], the selective 
models technique will be applied in connection with special filtration formulas, such 
as the extensively complete ones used in the first part of the paper. 
Finally, we will reconsider the main aspects involved in the semantical characteriza- 
tions of the maximal constructive logics presented in the two parts of the paper, both 
to outline possible new directions of investigation and to better understand the 
heuristic content of the examples already at disposal. Thus, we will put into evidence 
from an heuristic point of view some hidden differences involved in the Kripke 
semantics of the maximal constructive logics considered in the paper and in the 
Kripke semantics of a constructive logic introduced in [ 121 by L. L. Maksimova, we 
call the logic of the rhombuses and denote by RH. Such an heuristic comparison will 
be the starting point of a proof that, indeed, RH is not a maximal constructive logic. 
This disproves a conjecture of Chagrov and Zacharyashchev [3], which seemed to be 
highly plausible. 
2. Logics and nonstandard logics 
The set of the propositional well formed formulas (WIT) is defined as usual, using the 
connectives 1, v , A, + . If A is a wff, VA will be the set of propositional variables of A. 
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We say that a wff A is negated iff A = 1 B for some wff B. We say that A is 
negatively saturated iff all its variables are within the scope of -I. We say that A is 
a Harrop-formula [18, 143 iff A satisfies the following inductive conditions: 
(1) A is atomic or negated; 
(2) A = B A C, and B and C are Harrop-formulas; 
(3) A = B --f C, and C is an Harrop-formula. 
A substitution will be any function o associating, with every propositional variable, 
a wff. To denote the result of the application of the substitution 0 to the wff A, we will 
write o(A) or, more simply, aA. A restricted substitution will be any substitution err 
such that, for every variable p, a,(p) is a negated formula. A negatively saturated 
substitution will be any substitution crns uch that, for every variable p, a,,(p) is 
a negatively saturated formula. Finally, an Harrop-substitution will be any substitu- 
tion (Th such that, for every variable p, oh(p) iS an Harrop-formula. 
INT (respectively, CL) will denote both an arbitrary calculus for intuitionistic 
propositional logic (respectively, for classical propositional logic) and the set of 
intuitionistically valid wlf’s (respectively, the set of classically valid wff’s). 
As usual, an intermediate propositional logic will be any set L of wff’s satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(1) L is consistent; 
(2) INT G L; 
(3) L is closed under detachment; 
(4) L is closed under arbitrary subsitutions. 
Throughout this paper, the term “logic” will mean an intermediate propositional logic. 
As is well-known, for every logic L, we have INT c L E CL. Following tradition, we 
will define logics as sets of theorems of deductive systems. If & is a set of axiom- 
schemes and L is a logic, then the deductive system closed under detachment and 
arbitrary substitutions (logic) obtained by adding to L the axiom-schemes ofd will be 
denoted by L + ~4. If L1 and L2 are logics, then L1 + L2 will be the smallest logic 
containing both L1 and Lz. 
Following [14], an intermediate propositional nonstandard logic will be any set L of 
wff s satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) L is consistent; 
(2) INT E L; 
(3) L is closed under detachment; 
(4) L is closed under restricted substitutions. 
Throughout this paper, the term “nonstandard logic” will mean an inter- 
mediate propositional nonstandard logic. Sometimes we will call “standard” a 
logic, in order to distinguish it from the nonstandard logics which are not logics. Of 
course, any logic is also a nonstandard logic (but the converse does not hold in 
general). 
As for the logics, the following fact is immediate [14]: 
Proposition 1. IfL is a nonstandard logic, then INT 5 L E CL. 
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As discussed above for logics, we will define nonstandard logics as sets of theorems 
of deductive systems; however, we will adopt different notations, to better distinguish 
the two cases. Thus, if L is a nonstandard logic and 9’ is a set of formulas such that, for 
every A E 9’ and every restricted substitution or, o,(A) E L WY, then L 0 Y will be 
the deductive system (nonstandard logic) obtained by closing with respect o detach- 
ment the set of formulas L u Y. In this line, if L1 and Lz are nonstandard logics, then 
Li @ L, will be the smallest nonstandard logic containing both L1 and L1, i.e., the 
closure with respect o detachment of L1 u Lz. More generally, if Zf’i and Yz are two 
sets of formulas, Yi $ Y2 will indicate the closure with respect to detachment of 
,4p1 WY, (9, @,44* is not necessarily a nonstandard logic). 
As in [14], we define the extension operator E and the standardization operator S on 
the set of the nonstandard logics as follows: 
-If L is a nonstandard logic, then E(L) = L 0 {lip + p) p is a propositional 
variable}. 
-If L is a nonstandard logic, then S(L) = (A ) oA E L for every substitution r~}. 
As in [14], one easily deduces: 
Proposition 2. If L is a nonstandard logic, then E(L) is a nonstandard logic. 
Proposition 3. If L is a nonstandard logic, then S(L) is a (standard) logic. 
We call regular any nonstandard logic L such that L = E(L). As in [ 143, one easily 
shows: 
Proposition 4. If L is a regular nonstandard logic, then L is closed under the Harrop- 
substitutions. 
Of course, since 11 p + p belongs to any regular nonstandard logic, the only 
regular nonstandard logic which is also a (standard) logic is CL. 
We say that L is a nonstandard constructiue logic iff L is a nonstandard logic 
satisfying the disjunction property: 
(dp) AvBEL*AELorBEL. 
As a particular case, a constructive logic will be any (standard) logic satisfying (dp). 
The two following theorems are proved in [14]: 
Theorem 1. If L is a nonstandard constructive logic, then E(L) is a nonstandard 
constructive logic. 
Theorem 2. If L is a regular nonstandard constructive logic, then S(L) is a constructive 
logic. 
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The notion of maximality is defined both for the set of constructive logics and for 
the set of nonstandard constructive logics as follows [14]: 
-We say that L is a maximal constructive logic iff L is a constructive logic and, for 
every constructive logic L’, if L G L’ then L = L’. 
-We say that L is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic iff L is a nonstandard 
constructive logic and, for every nonstandard constructive logic L’, if L G L’ then 
L = L’. 
According to Theorem 1, every maximal nonstandard constructive logic is regular. 
Hence, since CL is not a constructive logic, we have: no maximal constructive logic is 
a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. 
From Theorems 1 and 2 we also deduce that every maximal constructive logic 
L satisfies the following fixed point equation: L = S(E(L)). This suggests the introduc- 
tion of the following definitions: 
-We say that a (standard) logic L is SE-stable iff L = S(E(L)). 
-We say that a (standard) logic L is neg.sat.-determined iff L satisfies the following 
property: if a& E L for every negatively saturated substitution ens, then A E L. 
The following theorem is proved in [14]: 
Theorem 3. A logic L is SE-stable ifSit is neg.sat.-determined. 
Incidentally, we remark that not only the maximal constructive logics are SE-stable 
(i.e., neg.sat.-determined), e.g., INT is such a logic [14]; of course, also the noncon- 
structive CL is such. 
The fundamental role played by the negatively saturated formulas in characterizing 
the maximal constructive logics is further stressed by the following results, which 
require the introduction of the reduction operator R on the set of nonstandard logics: 
-The negatively saturated part of the nonstandard logic L will be the set 
NS(L) = {A 1 A E L and A is negatively saturated}. 
- If L is a nonstandard logic, then R(L) = INT 0 NS(L). 
The following facts can be easily shown [14]: 
Proposition 5. If L is a nonstandard logic, then R(L) is a (standard) logic. 
Proposition 6. If L is a nonstandard logic, then: 
(a) L c E(R(L)) = E(L) (hence, L = E(R(L)) for L regular); 
(b) R(E(L)) = R(L) G S(L) E L; 
(c) if L = INT + &,,, is a (standard) logic and ._c4,, is a set of negatively saturated 
axiom schemes, then L = R(E(L)) = R(L). 
In [14] the following important fact is proved: 
Theorem 4. If L is a nonstandard constructive logic, then R(L) is a constructive logic. 
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Now, the relations between the maximal nonstandard constructive logics and the 
maximal constructive logics are stated by the two following theorems [14]: 
Theorem 5. If L is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic and L’ is a constructive 
logic such that R(L) E L’, then L’ E S(L) (h ence, S(L) is a maximal constructive logic 
if L is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic). 
Theorem 6. If L is a maximal constructive logic, then E(L) is a maximal nonstandard 
constructive logic. 
According to the above, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the maximal 
constructive logics and the maximal nonstandard constructive logics. Also, quoting 
[14], “it seems to be easier to find maximal nonstandard constructive logics than to 
find maximal constructive logics directly, because to find a maximal nonstandard 
constructive logic essentially amounts to finding a maximal set of special formulas, 
namely negatively saturated formulas”. In the present paper we will extensively show 
that the approach suggested by [14] is right, i.e., that the preliminary search of 
maximal nonstandard constructive logics is a good method to get maximal construc- 
tive logics. 
In the next two sections we will refine the method on the semantical ground. Now, 
we conclude this section quoting a result of [14] which will be useful later. 
Theorem 7. Zf L is a neg.sat.-determined logic and L’ is a logic such that 
R(L) E L’ G L and L # L’, then L’ is not neg.sat.-determined. 
3. Kripke frames semantics for logics and regular nonstandard logics 
We assume the reader to be familiar with the notion of Kripke model 
K = (P, <, It), where P = (P, < ) is a poset and I!- is the forcing relation, defined 
between elements of P and atomic formulas (propositional variables) and extended in 
the usual way to arbitrary wff’s; we say that K is built on the poset P, or that P is the 
underlying poset of K. A poset P is said to be principal iff P has a least element 0 (called 
the root of the poset). Following tradition, the posets will be called also frames. We will 
only consider principal posets and Kripke models built on them. To avoid unnecess- 
ary repetitions, we will consider “poset” (“frame”) as synonimous with “principal poset”. 
Sometimes we will explicitly indicate the least element 0 of the poset P or of the Kripke 
model K, by writing respectively P = (P, d ,O) and K = (P, d ,O, Ik). For any 
element M of a poset P = (P, 6 ), P,,., or, if necessary, also (P,, d ), denotes the 
principal subordering generated by tl in P, i.e., the restriction of (P, < ) to the set 
P, = { /? 1 fi E P and c1 < /I}. The poset P, will be called the cone of tx in P. 
An element C#J of P = (P, d ) will be calledjnal (in P) iff, for every 4’ E P, C#I < 4’ 
implies C#J = 4’. For any P = (P, d ) and any c( E P, Fin(cr)p will denote the set 
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(4 1 a < 4 and C$ is a final element in P}. When ambiguities cannot arise, we will write 
Fin(u) instead of Fin(a)P. We remark that Fin(a) is nonempty ifPis finite, while this is 
not necessarily true for an infinite P. Given P = (P, < ) and a nonfinal CI E P, we will 
also say that c1 is preJina1 (in P) iff all immediate successors of M in P are final. 
If % is a nonempty class of posets (of frames), X(%) will denote the set 
{K = (P, < , IF) 1 (P, < ) E %}; X(%) will be said to be the class ofKripke models 
built on 8. Also, for every nonempty class % of posets, U(%) will indicate the set 
{Alfor every K= (P, <,O,lt) E X(%),OltA}. 
As is well-known, for every nonempty class % of frames, Y(S) is a logic [l&4]. 
According to this fact, Z(9) will be called the (standard) logic generated by %. Also, 
we will say that a logic L has a Kripke frames semantics iff there is a nonempty % such 
that L = Z(%). As proved in [17], there are logics without Kripke frames semantics. 
We say that a Kripke model K = (P, d , It) is regular iff, for every M E P and every 
variable p, the following condition holds: 
(* ) if cx Ifp and ct IV1 p, then there is /I E P such that ~1 d p and B II’1 p (of course, from 
CI V1 p it follows that there is y E P such that CI < y and y Ik p). 
For any nonempty class % of posets, SC,,,(%) will denote the set 
{K = (P, d , It-) 1 K is regular and (P, d ) E S}; A!“,,,(%) will be said to be the class 
of regular Kripke models built on %. Also, for every nonempty class % of posets, 
2?_,(%) will indicate the set {A 1 for every K = (P, < ,O, It) E SC_(%), OH- A}. 
The regular Kripke models and the related definitions of -X,,,(%) and _Yp,,,(%) 
will be used to give a notion of Kripke frame semantics for regular nonstandard logics. 
To better analyze what is involved in this semantics, we need a definition and a related 
proposition. 
We say that a poset P = (P, d ) has the property of the final elements iff the 
following condition holds: 
(**) for every c1 E P, there is 4 E P such that a d C$ and I$ is final. 
We also say that a class % of posets has the property of the$nal elements iff every 
element of % has. 
As far as only the propositional evel is involved, the following proposition holds: 
Proposition 7. For every class 9 offrames there is a class %’ offrames such that %’ 
has the property of thefinal elements, Y(%) = _Y(%‘) and _TZ_,(%) = Zreg(%‘). 
Proof (Outline). Let v be a finite set of propositional variables, and let c( be an element 
of a Kripke model K = (P, <,O,Ik). We call atomic v-forcing of c1 (in K) the set 
f~=(pJp~vandaItp}u{~p~p~vand~lt~p}.Wealsosaythatccisv-final(inK)iff 
) f:l = I VI, where 1 . . . ( indicates the cardinality of a set. The following facts can be 
easily proved: 
(i) for every cc E P, there is /I E P such that CI < b and /I is v-final; 
(ii) if CI and /I are two v-final elements of P such that f ,” = f i, then, for every wff 
A such that *yA s v, o!lkA iff /Ill-A. 
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Given K= (P, <,O,It), u and UEP, we set Fin(a)“= {/?EPlcr < b and /I is 
u-final). Since u is finite, there is only a finite number of distinct atomic o-forcings of 
elements of P. Letfy , . . . ,fi be all such atomic u-forcings and let us suppose, without 
loss of generality, that { fy, . . . . fX}nP=@Wesaythat(& ,..., 4.) s {fV, ..., fi)is 
the complete set of atomic u-forcingsfor Fin(a)” iff the following conditions hold: 
- for every y E Fin(a)“, there is i such that 1 < i Q n andf; = 4i; 
- for every i such that 1 < i < n, there is y E Fin(a)” such that 4i = f t. 
Now, for every K = (P, < ,O, It) and every finite set of propositional variables u, 
we define the u-pruned model of K, denoted by k” = (P”, Q “,O”, ik”>, as foilows: 
_ every element of P which is not u-final belongs to P”; moreover, for every element 
a of P which is not u-final, if { C#J 1, . . . ,&} is the complete set of atomic u-forcings for 
Fin(a)” then {c$~, . . . ,I$,,} 5 P”; 
-a <“fl iff: 
_ x and j? are not u-final in K and a Q /?; 
- a is not u-final in K and fi belongs to the complete set of atomic u-forcings for Fin(a)“; 
- 0” = 0 (if 0 is not u-final); 
- for every a E P” n P and every p, a II-“p (in K”) iff a IF p (in K); 
-for every $E P”n(fy,... f i> and every p E u, ~#~lt”p (in K”) iff p E 4; 
- for every propositional variable p which does not belong to u, we set (e.g.) 4 It “p 
(in K”). 
We call P” = (P”, <“,O”) the u-pruned poset obtained from K. By (i) and the 
definition of P”, we have that in P” every element is followed by a final element. Also, 
using the above property (ii), one easily proves: 
(iii) for every wff A such that *ya s u and every 4 E P” n {f “1, .. . , f t:}, cj It” A (in K”) 
iff, for every a E P such that f 1 = 4, CI I- A (in K); for every wff A such that VA c u and 
every a E P”nP, alt”A (in K”) iff altA (in K); 
(iv) if K is regular then K” is. 
On the other hand, we immediately get: 
(v) if P” = (P”, 6 “, 0”) is the u-pruned poset obtained from K = (P, < ,O, It), 
K’ = (P”, <“, O”, IF’) is a model built on P”, P = (P, d , 0) is the underlying poset of 
K and u‘ is any finite set of propositional variables, then there is a model 
K” = (P, <, 0, I,“) built on P such that the following conditions hold: 
(vl) foreverywffAwithV.. E u’andevery~~P”n{f~,...,f~},~Ik’A(inZC’)iff, 
for every a of K such that f i = 4, a k”A (in K”); for every wff A with VA E u’ 
and every a E P”nP, ak’A (in K’) iff alk”A (in K’); 
(vz) if K’ is regular then K” is. 
Now, let F’ = {P” 1 there are K E X (9) and u such that P” is the u-pruned poset 
obtained from K>. Then, properties (iii) and (iv) provide 9’(9’) 5 Z(F) and 
dip,,,(Y’) E JZ~,,(Y); on the other hand, property(v) provides Y(R) c 2?(9’) and 
=9&Y) c .Ip,,,(Y’). 0 
Remark. Let B be any class of frames, let r be a set of wff’s and let A be a wff. We say 
that A is a %-consequence of r (respectively, a regular %-consequence of I-), and we 
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write r+ SA (respectively, r k reg,Y A), iff the following condition holds: for every 
K = (P, < , It) E X(.9) (respectively, K = (P, G, It) E K,,,(B)) and every a E P, if 
aikB for every B E r then crlt A. We have, in particular, that A E U(F) iff 8 k* A 
(respectively, A E $Preg(g) iff 0 k reg,9 A). 
Now, if r is an infinite set, the construction involved in the proof of the above 
Proposition 7 cannot be used to guarantee that, for every class 9 of posets, there is 
a class 9’ with the property of the final elements uch that r l= my A iff r k 9’ A 
(respectively, r + reg,9 A iff r k reg,9C A). 
In the following, we will not be concerned with F-consequence and regular 
s-consequence, but only with the sets of formulas 58(p) and Yp,,,(g). Thus, unless 
otherwise stated, henceforth poset and class of posets will be synonimous, respectively, 
with poset with the property of the final elements and with class of posets with the 
property of the final elements. By Proposition 7, this convention will not affect the 
generality of our treatment. 
One easily proves: 
Proposition 8. A model K = (P, < , II-) is regular iK for every CI E P and every variable 
p, LI Ikp ifs, for every C$ E Fin(a), C$ II-p. 
Proposition 9. A model K = (P, d , It-) is regular ifl, for every II E P and every 
variable p, a Iti 1 p -+ p. 
The proof of the following proposition is easy and can be carried out using 
Propositions 8 and 9. We leave it to the reader. 
Proposition 10. For every nonempty class F of frames, Treg (9) is a regular nonstan- 
dard logic. 
According to Proposition 10, S?,,,(9) will be called the regular nonstandard logic 
generated by 9. Also, we will say that a regular logic L has a Kripke frames semantics 
iff there is a nonempty 9 such that L = U,,,(F). 
Now, we compare Y(9) and _YJY), using the operators E, S and R defined in 
the previous section. 
First of all, we make the following remark. Let K = (P, 6, It) be any Kripke 
model and let K’ = (P, <, IF’) be obtained from K by (possibly) modifying its forcing 
in the following way: for every CI E P and every variable p, all-‘p iff, for every 
C$ E Fin(a), C$ Il-p (in K). Then, K’ turns out to be a regular Kripke model, we call the 
regular Kripke model associated with K (one has K = K iff K is regular). One easily 
shows that, for every Kripke model K = (P, d, II), for every a E P and every 
negatively saturated formula A, a 11 A (in K) iff c1 IF' A (in the regular Kripke model K’ 
associated with K). Hence (since the class of all the regular Kripke models associated 
with elements of X(p) coincides with Xr,,(F)), one immediately deduces: 
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Proposition 11. For every nonempty class 9 offrames, R(Z& 9)) G Y(9). 
Using Proposition 11, we can prove: 
Theorem 8. For every nonempty class 9 offrames, Yr,,(9) = E(Y(9)). 
Proof. Since X,,,(F) E ,X(p), we have Y(9) E Y&s). Also, by Proposition 9, 
11~ + p E Z_.,(9) for every variable p. It follows that E(_Y(Y)) E Z&9). 
To prove the converse, let us assume, on the contrary, that .5Yp,,,(Y) is not included 
in E(_Y(F)). Then there is a formula A(p,, . . . ,p,) E Y,,,(Y) such that 
A(P 1, . . . ,p,) $ E(Z(9)). Since llpi -piEE(~(9)) for 1 < i < n (by definition 
of E(_Y(F))) and since the replacement holds in E(9(9)), we must have 
A(llp, , . . . ,llp,,) $ E(_Y(F)). A fortiori, A(l-~p,, . . . ,l-~pJ 4 Z(F). But 
A(~~PI , . . . ,ll p,,) is a negatively saturated formula belonging to Zreg(p), since 
A(P 1, . . ..p.) E 5Yr,,(9). It follows that A(-~lp,, . . ..llpJ E R(_Yr,,(9)), by def- 
inition of R. Hence, by Proposition 11, A(iip Ir . . . . lip.) E Y(4), a contradic- 
tion. 0 
Corollary 1. If Y(F) is a maximal constructive logic, then _Yreg(F) is a maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic. 
Thus, if L is a maximal constructive logic with Kripke frames semantics, a fortiori 
the corresponding maximal nonstandard constructive logic has a Kripke frames 
semantics. More generally, it seems to be harder to find regular nonstandard logics 
without Kripke frames semantics than to find (standard) logics without Kripke frames 
semantics, in line with the following proposition: 
Proposition 12. Let L be any regular nonstandard logic without Kripke frames seman- 
tics and let L’ be any (standard) logic such that R(L) c L’ G S(L). Then L’ is without 
Kripke frames semantics. 
Proof. Since L = E(L), from Proposition 6 we easily deduce E(R(L)) = E(L’) = 
E(S(L)) = L. Now, suppose L’ = Y(F). It follows, by Theorem 8, E(L’) = YPrep(9), 
hence L = P’,,,(P). But L is a regular logic without Kripke frames semantics, 
a contradiction. 0 
In this paper we will not be concerned, however, in generalizing the results of [17] 
to regular nonstandard logics. Thus, we leave open the problem of jinding regular 
nonstandard logics (possibly, maximal nonstandard constructive logics) without Kripke 
frames semantics. 
We will be interested, on the other hand, in providing a Kripke frames semantics for 
the maximal constructive logic S(L), once L has been recognized to be a maximal 
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nonstandard constructive logic and to have the form L = _Yreg(%). Using Theorem 7, 
we can prove: 
Theorem 9. Let L be a maximal nonstandard constructive logic, let L = _Yr,,(%) for 
some nonempty class 9 offrames, and let 3’(%) be a neg.sat.-determined logic. Then 
the corresponding maximal constructive logic S(L) coincides with .3’(%). 
Proof. Since, by definition of S, S(L) is the greatest (standard) logic contained in L, 
we have Y(%) E S(L). On the other hand, by Proposition 11, one has that 
R(L?~,,(%)) = R(L) G Y(S). Also, since R(L) G S(L) and since R(L) = R(R(L)), 
one has R(L) = R(R(L)) G R(S(L)) E R(L), from which it follows R(L) = R(S(L)). 
Thus, we have R(S(L)) G _Y(%) c S(L). This implies, by Theorem 7, that S(L) = 
_Y(%). As a matter of fact, S(L) is a maximal constructive logic, hence S(L) is 
SE-stable, hence, by Theorem 3, S(L) is neg.sat.-determined; thus, by Theorem 7, 
_Y(%) # S(L) implies that Y(%) is not neg.sat.-determined, a contradiction. 0 
The above Theorem 9 will be one of the key points of our method. We do not know 
whether there is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic L such that L = Y,,,(%) 
for some 9, but Y(%‘) is not neg.sat.-determined for every 8’ such that 
L = .Z’,,8(%‘); in such a case, by the above results, S(L) could not have a Kripke 
frames semantics. 
To conclude this section, we extend a well-known sufficient condition generally 
used to state the constructiveness of (standard) logics. 
- We say that a nonempty class % of posets has the strong disjoint embedding property 
(which we will indicate by (s.d.e.p.)) iff, for any two posets P = (P, d ) E 9 and 
P’ = (P’, <‘) E %, there are a poset PI’ = (P” , < “) E % and two elements tl E P” 
and p E P” such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) P is isomorphic to Pz and P’ is isomorphic to Pi; 
(2) Ph’nP;; =0. 
It is well known that if % is a nonempty class of posets satisfying (s.d.e.p.), then 
Y(%) is a constructive logic [2-7,12,15,16,18]. The proof is easy and can be 
restated, without problems, for the regular logic _!?‘“,,,(%). Thus, we have: 
Proposition 13. If % is a nonempty class offrames satisfying (s.d.e.p.), then: 
(a) _Y(%) is a constructive logic; 
(b) _Yp,,,(%) is a regular nonstandard constructive logic. 
4. The filtration technique of the quotient models 
If r is any set of wlYs and L is any nonstandard logic, we say that A is L-provable 
from P, and we denote it by f FL A, iff there are B1 , . , B, such that {B,, . . . ,B,} c P 
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andB, A . . . A B, + A E L. On the other hand, f l$ A will mean that r l-L A does not 
hold. We introduce the following notions: 
- A saturated set P is any consistent set of WE’S closed under INT-provability (i.e., 
r FiNT A implies A E r) and under the disjunction property (i.e., A v B E r implies 
A E P or B E P). 
- If L is a nonstandard logic, L s f and r is saturated, then r is closed under 
L-provability: in this sense, we say that r is L-saturated. 
- If r is a saturated set, by the canonical model generated by P, in symbols, %?(r), we 
mean the Kripke model K = (P, d ,O, IF) satisfying the following properties: 
(1) P = { r’ 1 r c r’ and r’ is saturated}; 
(2) for any two r’, r” E P, r’ d r” iff r’ s r”; 
(3) 0 = r; 
(4) for any r’ E P and any propositional variable p, r’ It-p iff p E r’. 
~ If r is L-saturated, then all elements of%(P) include L; in this case we say that V(f) 
is the L-canonical model generated by r, and we write VL(r) instead of V?(r). 
Since every saturated set can be extended into some maximal consistent one, it is 
easily seen that the underlying poset of any model ‘+ZL(r) has the property of the final 
elements. The following facts are well known for the (standard) logics [lS, 1541 and 
hold as well for arbitrary nonstandard logics: 
Proposition 14. If L and A are (respectively) a nonstandard logic and a set of wfl’s such 
that A sl, A, then there is a L-saturated set P such that A c P and A$ r. 
Proposition 15. Zf L is a nonstandard logic, P is L-saturated, r’ is an element of %TL(r) 
and B is any wf, then r’ IF B holds in %TL(P) ifs B E P’. 
Propositions 9 and 15 immediately yield: 
Proposition 16. Zf L is a regular nonstandard logic and r is L-saturated, then GTT~(P) is 
a regular Kripke model. 
Propositions 14 and 15 are the basic tools to prove the completeness of a logic 
according to the following well-known proof strategy. Suppose L is a (standard) logic 
syntactically characterized, e.g., as L = INT + d, where JZJ is set of axiom-schemes. 
Suppose also that F is a nonempty class of posets, intended to provide the Kripke 
frames semantics of L. Then one has to show that L = Y(F), which splits into the 
separate proofs that L E Y(F) (soundness theorem) and that Y(F) E L (complete- 
ness theorem). Quite often, the proof of the soundness theorem is direct and easy, so 
that to state that L = 2(F) amounts to state the completeness theorem. Now, the 
latter theorem immediately follows from Propositions 14 and 15 if, for every L- 
saturated set r, the underlying poset of the canonical model VL(r) turns out to belong 
to a. 
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This use of the canonical models to prove the completeness theorem for a logic is 
successful in many cases; in these cases, we say that the proof is carried out with the 
method of the canonical models. This method can be used, as well, to obtain completeness 
theoremsfir a regular nonstandard logic L, in order to show that L = _Yi9,,,(9). For, in 
this case the problem might be that the models %YL(r) are not regular. But this 
circumstance is excluded by Proposition 16. 
Remark. When it can be successfully applied, the method of the canonical models 
provides more than the completeness theorem for a logic (respectively, for a regular 
nonstandard logic) L. As a matter of fact, suppose that, for every L-saturated set r, the 
underlying poset of the canonical model gL(r) belongs to some class F of posets. 
Then, by Propositions 14 and 15 (respectively, by Propositions 14-16) we get the 
strong completeness theorem for L with respect o 9, i.e.: for every set A of WE’S 
A +.F A implies A l--L A (respectively, A brreg,,~ A implies A FL A). As discussed above 
for the ordinary completeness theorem, usually the strong completeness theorem 
provides the main part of a proof that, for every A, A +.s A iff A t, A (respectively, 
A + reg,.~ A iff A FL A). Indeed, in the most cases the proof of the strong soundness 
theoremfor L with respect o 9, according to which A kr. A implies A b_.~ A for every 
A (respectively, A t--r, A implies A I=reg,,~ A for every A), is as easy and direct as the 
proof of the related ordinary soundness theorem. 
Since the underlying poset of any canonical model ‘ZL(r) has the property of the 
final elements, notice that from a successful application of the method of the canonical 
models one can always get a strong completeness theorem with respect o some class 
of posets with the property of the final elements. 
The method of the canonical models (both for standard logics, using Propositions 
14 and 15, and for regular nonstandard logics, using Propositions 14-16) may fail to 
be successful in various cases, such as the ones with which we will be concerned in 
both parts of the present paper. To treat these cases, we will make an indirect use of 
the canonical models, which will be transformed, by means of techniques we are going 
to explain, into finite models equivalent to them with respect to a set of relevant 
formulas which can be codified, so to speak, by a “finite amount of information” (from 
this point of view, the resulting finite models cannot be used to get strong completeness 
theorems, generally involving “injinite amounts of information”; see the remark at the 
end of this section). These techniques are the so-called filtration techniques 
[5-7,16,15,4] and can be applied to any model (canonical or not), even if they become 
interesting only when the starting models have nice properties, as in the case of the 
canonical models. In this part of the paper we will present and use a construction 
introduced by Gabbay for the logic KP of Kreisel and Putnam [S, 63, which we call 
the quotient models technique; on the other hand, in the second part we will present 
and use the selective models technique, introduced in [15], which is a variant of the 
technique of Gabbay and de Jongh [6,7], enriched by a quotientation of the final 
states. In both parts we will also use special refinements, introduced in [4], based on 
careful choices of the formulas defining the filtrations. In this line, notions such as the 
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one of extensively complete formula will allow us to considerably strengthen the power 
of our techniques, as we shall see later. 
Now we explain the quotient models technique. 
Given any wff H, we let Sf( H) be the set of subformulas of H, while Sf,, _ ,7 (H) 
denotes the infinite set of wff’s which can be built starting from the elements of Sf( H) 
only using the connectives A, + ,l. Following [5,6], given a Kripke model 
K=(P, <,lt)andr,fl~P,weseta ~Hj?iff,foreveryH’ESf,,,.,(H),ifal~H’ 
then jI Ik H’. We also set a E H /.I iff r sH fl and /I EH a. The relation = H is an 
equivalence relation. By a result of Diego and MC Kay quoted in [5,6], there exists 
only a finite number of intuitionistically non equivalent wfi’s built up starting from 
a finite set of propositional variables and using only the connectives A, -+ , -I. Hence, 
as in [5,6], one deduces: 
Proposition 17. The set of equivalence classes of cH on the set of elements of K isjnite. 
As in [S, 61, given K = (P, < , IF), we define the quotient model K/ zH to be the 
Kripke model (I”, < ‘, It’) with the following properties: 
(1) P’ is the set of equivalence classes generated by = H on the set of elements of P; 
(2) if [a] and [/I] are two elements of P’ (where [r] is the class of y), then [r] < ‘[/I] 
iff r E”/?; 
(3) for every variable p such that p E Sf,, +,7 (H), and for every element [z] E P’, 
[a] IF’p iff cx It p in K; for every variable q such that q # Sf,, -, ,7 (H), and for every 
element [a] E P’, [a] II-’ q in K/ E “. 
The main property of K/ eH is stated in the following proposition, and can be 
proved by induction on the wff B as in [S, 63: 
Proposition 18. If BE Sf,, _,_ (H) then, for every element a of K, a 11 B (in K) iff 
[a] Ik’ B (in K/ E “). 
We also have, as an immediate consequence of Propositions 9 and 16 and of the 
definitions of K/ z H and of regular Kripke model: 
Proposition 19. If K is any regular Kripke model and H is any formula, then KJ -” is 
a regular Kripke model. 
Proposition 18 allows us to use the quotient models in completeness proofs of 
logics. For example, let 9 be a class of frames for which one has to prove the 
completeness theorem of a (standard) logic L, and suppose that V,(T)/ =” turns out 
to be built on a poset of 9 for every r and H. Then, by Propositions 14 and 15, for 
every A$ L there is a bPL(r) whose root does not force A, whence, by Proposition 18, 
the root of V,_.(f)/-,, does not force A. Thus, Y(9) E L, i.e., the completeness 
theorem of L with respect o 4 holds. 
The addition of Proposition 19 is needed in order to use the quotient models 
technique for completeness proofs of regular nonstandard logics. 
18 M. Ferrari, P. Miglioli / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 76 (1995) I-46 
As said above, a careful choice of the formula H to make the model K/ =H (let us 
call H the filtration formula) may strengthen the quotient models technique. For 
example, let us consider standard logics (a quite similar discussion can be made for 
regular nonstandard logics). To prove that 9’(p) c L (completeness theorem), it 
suffices to show, by Proposition 18, that %?L(r)/=H is built on a poset belonging to 
F fir every wfs H. The proof of the latter fact is the main concern of the usual 
applications of the quotient models technique. But the use of arbitrary filtration 
formulas H is not necessary. Suppose that there is a class ?V of formulas satisfying the 
following properties: 
(a) for every wff H, there is a W E %f such that H is a subformula of W; 
(b) for every W E +f, VL(r)/ = w is built on a poset of 9. 
Then, Proposition 18 allows as well to conclude that U(F) c L. Moreover, the 
choice of -w^ may be made in such a way that the models qL(r)/ 3 w have nice 
properties giving rise to easier completeness proofs. 
In this perspective, we are going to define a suitable class YY of formulas, called 
extensively complete. 
_ Let W be a wff and let V&, = (pl, . . . ,p,} be the set of propositional variables of W. 
Let I be any classical interpretation of the elements of VW and let ii, . . . ,fi,, be wlI”s 
SO defined, for 1 < i < n: Bi = pi if I(pi) = T (T the true truth value); fii = lpi if 
I(pi) = F (F the false truth value). Let US set HI = $I A ... A p^,,. Let 
4; = {Ii,..., l,} (with k < 2”) b e any nonempty set of classical interpretations of the 
elements of VW, and let D9 = H,, v ... v HI.. Let X1, . . . ,9, be all the nonempty 
sets of classical interpretations of the elements of “yw and let Zw = DjI A ... A Dfpm. 
Then, we say that W is a complete formula iff Zw is a subformula of W. 
- Given any finite set u of variables, the set of negated formulas containing only 
variables of u is divided into a finite set of equivalence classes [18], by intuitionis- 
tic biimplication. By a v-complete set of negated formulas we mean any (finite) set 
{-lCI, . . . ,I C,} satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) for every equivalence class [l B],, there is an i, 1 < i 6 h, such that 
lCiE[lB]"; 
(2) for every i,j with 1 < i,j < h and i # j, [1 Ci]” # [lCilV. 
- Let W be a wff and let V, be the set of its propositional variables. Let 
N = (1 Ci , . . . ,l C,} be a V+complete set of negated formulas and let N1, . . . , N, 
be all the nonempty subsets of N. Let, for every j with 1 < j < m, DNj be the 
disjunction of all the formulas Of Nj. Finally, let .Zb = DN, A +.. A DN~. We say that 
W is a negatively complete formula if Zk is a subformula of W. 
- We say that a wff W is an extensively complete formula iff W is both a complete 
formula and a negatively complete formula. 
Of course, for every wff H there is a wff W such that H is a subformula of W and 
W is extensively complete. Thus, we can summarize the above discussion about the 
possibility of choosing particular (and appropriate) filtration formulas in the following 
proposition. 
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Proposition 20. Let L be a logic (respectively, a regular nonstandard logic) and let % be 
a nonempty class ofposets such that, for every L-saturated set r and every extensively 
complete formula W, qL(r)/ 3 ,+, is built on a poset of 8. Then Y(%) G L (respect- 
ively, YJ%) E L). 
In the following, we will apply the quotient model technique using extensively 
complete filtration formulas, according to Proposition 20. The extensively complete 
formulas allow us to simplify many proofs and in some cases are necessary. 
Remark. The quotient models technique does not provide strong completeness 
proofs. Indeed, such a technique allows us to constructjnite models starting from sets 
of formulas Sf ,, , + ,7 (W), defined by appropriate formulas W. On the other hand, 
suppose this technique is applied to prove, for an infinite set A of WIT’S, that (e.g.) 
A blu: A implies A FL A. Then the application is successful only if there is some 
formula Z such that A u {A} G Sf,, +,7 (Z); but, being A infinite, in general such 
a Z cannot exist. 
5. The logic ST 
We now consider the logic ST of Scott, quoted in the Section 1 and syntactically 
characterized as INT + {(ST)}, where (ST) is the axiom-schema ((ii,4 -+ A) -+ 
A v 1 A) --) 1 A v 11 A. To provide a semantical characterization for ST, we define 
the class %sT of frames as follows. 
- Let P = (P, < ) be a poset and let 4 and $ be two final states of P. We say that 
4 and + are prejinally connected in P iff either C$ = $ or there is a sequence 
41, . . . , &(n > 1) of final states of P satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) 41 = 4 and A, = ICI; 
(2) for every i, 1 < i < n - 1, there is a E P such that a is prefinal in P and 
{4i,4i+l) G Fin(a). 
- Bsr will be the class of all finite frames P = (P, < ) such that, for every a E P and 
for every C$ and + belonging to Fin(a), 4 and + are prefinally connected in the cone 
P, of a in P. 
First of all, we have: 
Proposition 21. ST E 9(%sT). 
Proof. Let us assume the contrary. Then there is a Kripke model K = (P, 6 ,O, It) 
together with an instance INST = ((1iA -,A)-*AvlA)-,lAvllAof(ST) 
such that P = (P, < ,O) E %-ST and 0 #INST. It follows that there is a E P such that 
a It (11 A + A) -+ A v 1 A, and a IV1 A and a If11 A. Hence, there are two distinct 
final states 4 and $ of P such that (4, $1 c Fin(a), C$ It A and II/ Iti A. Let c$~, . .. , qJ 
be a sequence of final states of P prefinally connecting 4 and tj in P,, with 4 = 4 1 and 
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$ = 4”. We prove by induction on i, 1 ,< i Q n, that $i Il- A. For, 4i It A. Moreover, 
let 1 < j d n - 1, let /? be a prefinal element of P such that CI < fi and 
Fin(D) 2 {~j, dj+i }, and let (induction hypothesis) +jll- A. If $j+i I# A, then, since 
b is prefinal, p Il- 11 A + A. Thus, since CI 11 (ii A + A) + A v 1 A implies 
bIt(ll A -+ A) + A v 1 A, one has PI1 A vi A, which contradicts the fact that 
{~j,~j+l} E Fin(b). It follows that 4j+i It A, which completes our induction. We 
therefore have & It A, i.e., I,$ It A, a contradiction. 0 
We now prove that 3(psT) c ST using the quotient models technique with 
extensively complete filtration formulas. To do so, first of all we remark that 
(((1lP + P) -+ P VlP) -+ 1P VllP)~(((llP + P) +lP v 1lP) + 1p v 
11 p) E INT (the proof is left to the reader as an exercise). Then, if (ST’ ) is the 
axiom-schema ((ii A + A) + 1 A v 11 A) + 1 A v 11 A, we have: 
Proposition 22. The logic ST coincides with INT + {(ST’)}. 
We also need a lemma. 
Lemma 1. Let L be any nonstandard logic such that ST E L. Let P be any L-saturated 
set offormulas and let W be an extensively complete formula. Let P’ = (P’, <’ > be the 
underlying poset of wL( P)/ E w. Let [IT] and [ @] be two elements of P’ such that [@I is 
final in P’ and [@I . IS an immediate successor of [ZZ] in P’. Then [Ii’] is prefinal in P’. 
Proof. Let us assume the contrary. Then there are nonfinal immediate successors 
CCII, ... 3 [C,] of [n] in P’, with k 3 1. Let {[Yu,],...,[Y’m]} = Fin([Z,])u...u 
Fin( [C,]). Consider any [ Yi] (with 1 6 i G m), and let (according to the definition of 
complete formula, given in the previous section) Ii and Hli be, respectively, the 
classical interpretation associated with (the final element) [Yi] and the formula 
associated with Ii; then, if [A] is any element of P’ different from [ Yi], we have both 
[d] l)I’Hli and [Yi] IF’ HI,, where 11 is the forcing of wL(r)/ z w. Let A = 
H,, v ‘.. v Him, . then, for every CO] E P’, [0] It’ A iff [0] E {[Y 1], . . . , [ Y,]}. Also, 
since W is an extensively complete formula (hence a complete formula), we can 
assume, without loss of generality, that A E Sf,, --1,7 (W) (if A is not a subformula of 
W, then there is a subformula A’ of W which is intuitionistically equivalent o A, 
differing from A only for the ordering of the disjuncts and of the conjuncts within the 
disjuncts). Finally, since W (being extensively complete) is negatively complete, we can 
assume, without loss of generality, that 1 A, 11 A and iA v iiA belong to 
Sf,, +,7 ( W) (e.g., by definition of negatively complete formula, there is a subformula 
of W which is intuitionistically equivalent to 1 A v ilA). It follows that 
‘iiA-+A, (iiA+A)+iAviiA and ((iiA+A)-+iAv~iA)+ 
1 A v 11 A belong to Sf,, _,7 (W). In particular, we get [U] ll-‘((ii A + A) -+ 
1 A v 11 A) -+ 1 A v 11 A. As a matter of fact, by Proposition 22, all the states of 
qL(f) contain all the instances of (ST’); hence Z7 IF ((IT A -+ A) + 1 A v 11 A) --t 
1 A v 11 A, where IF is the forcing of %L (r); hence our assertion, by Proposition 18. 
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On the other hand, consider any [Ci], with 1 < i < k. Since 
Fin(CCJ) E {CYil, . . . ,CY,l}, we have that [Ci] It’ll A. Also, if [@‘I is any final 
element of P’ such that [@‘I $ {[ Y,], . . . ,[ YJ}, then [@‘I It’1 A. It follows that 
[n] Ik’(ll A + A) + 1 A v 11 A. As a matter of fact, let [H’] be any element of P’ 
such that [n] G’ [Zl’] and [n’] I\11 A -+ A. Then [n] # [In’], since 
[n] II”11 A + A (being, e.g., [n] 6 ‘[C,], [C,] 11’11 A and [C,] IV’ A). It follows 
that either Fin([n’]) G {[Yr], . . . , [ ‘Pm]}, which implies [n’] It’ll A, or [n’] is 
a final element of VL(r)/ --w and [~‘]${[Y,],...,[Y,]}, which implies 
[n’] It’1 A; in both cases, [W] It’1 A v 11 A, which provides our assertion. 
Now, from [Il]It’((~~A-+A)-+~Av~~A)+~Av~~A and [Z7]lt’ 
(11 A -+ A) + 1 A v 11 A we get [n] 11’1 A v 11 A. This is a contradiction, 
since, e.g., in P’ one has {[@I, [Yi]} E Fin([n]) with [CD] It-‘iA and 
[Y,] II-‘1lA. I-J 
Using Lemma 1, we can prove: 
Theorem 10. If L is any nonstandard logic such that ST G L, r is any L-saturated set 
and W is any extensively completeformula, then VL(r)/ = w is built on a poset of .FST. 
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then, in the underlying poset P’ = (P’, <‘) of 
VL(r)/= W, there are [A], [@I and [Y] such that Fin([d]) z {[@],[Y]}, but [@I 
and [Y] are not prefinally connected in the cone PiAl of [A] in P’. Since P’ is finite, we 
can assume, without loss of generality, that [A] satisfies the following further 
property: 
(i) for every immediate successor [C] of [A] in P’, either all the element of Fin ([ C]) 
are prefinally connected with [@I in the cone Pbz, of [C] in P’, or no element of 
Fin( [Cl) is prefinally connected with [@I in the cone Pbzl of [C] in P’. 
For, if [A] does not satisfy (i), take, in place of [A], some [Ai] which is an 
immediate successor of [A] and is followed by [@I and a second final element not 
prefinally connected with [@I in the cone of [A i] in P’; and so on, until a nonfinal 
state [An] is reached which satisfies the properties required for [A]. 
Now, we will divide the states of Fin([d]) into two classes: the first class, which is 
nonempty and will be called S, contains all the elements of Fin([d]) which are 
prefinally connected with [@I in Pb~l; the second class, which is nonempty too, 
contains all the elements of Fin([d]) which are not prefinally connected with [@I in 
Pkd3. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1, we can choose a formula A such that: 
(ii) A, 1 A, 11 A and 1 A v 11 A are intuitionistically equivalent o elements of 
Sf,, -+,7 (W; 
(iii) for every [0] E P’, [0] It’A (in gL(r)/ = W) iff [0] E 9. 
Now, we remark that, by Lemma 1, there must be an element [n] of gL(r)/ E W 
such that [A] <‘[n], [n] is not a final element of P’ and Fin([n]) E f. For, 
consider any element of y, say [<PI, and let [n] be an element of the cone Pkdl such 
that [@I is an immediate successor of [n] in PiAl. Then, by Lemma 1, [fl] is 
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a prefinal state of P’. Hence, all the elements of Fin ([III]) are prefinally connected with 
[@I, i.e., Fin([n]) E 9 as required. 
Now, we have: 
(iv) [d] I!-‘(7iA -+ A) + iA vi7A. 
To prove (iv), let [d] <‘Cd’] and let [d’]ll-‘1lA -+ A. Then [d] # [A’]. As 
a matter of fact, let us consider the element [n] defined above. Since Fin([n]) c 9, 
from (iii) we get [fl] Iti1 A. On the other hand, since [n] is not final in P’, (iii) yields 
also [n] #‘A. Being [d] d ’ [ZI], we therefore get [A] If’iiA + A, which implies 
[d] # [A’], q.e.d.. Thus, there is an immediate successor [C] of [d] in P’ such that 
[Z] <‘[A’]; by (i) and (iii), this implies that either [A’] lt’-~A or [A’] II-‘-I-IA. 
Since [A’] is any element in P’ following [A] and forcing 11 A + A in gL(r)/ z W, 
we have therefore proved (iv). 
Now, by (ii), ((ii A + A) -+ 1 A v TTA) + 1 A v -11 A turns out to be intui- 
tionistically equivalent to a formula of Sf,, ~, 1 (IV). Hence, using Propositions 22 
and 18, as in the proof of Lemma 1 we get [d]lI-‘((1iA + A) + 
i A v 11 A) 3 1 A v 11 A; this implies, by (iv), [d] 11’1 A v 11 A. Arguing as 
in the proof of Lemma 1, the latter fact gives rise to a contradiction. 0 
Proposition 21 and Theorem 10 immediately ield: 
Corollary 2. ST = 9(%,,). 
As is well-known [lo, 1,16,15], ST is a constructive logic. A proof of this fact, on the 
other hand, can be easily obtained also from Proposition 13 and Corollary 2, since 
a trivial construction shows that %sT satisfies (s.d.e.p.). Thus, we have: 
Proposition 23. ST is a constructive logic. 
Remarks. (a) In [ 163 Minari conjectures that ST has not a Kripke frames semantics. 
On the other hand, in that paper a class 9 of frames is defined such that if ST has 
a Kripkeframes emantics, then ST = Yip(%). Indeed, it can be proved that the class of 
all finite posets of % coincides with %sT. 
(b) Under our notion of poset as a partially ordered set satisfying the property of 
the final elements, we can prove Proposition 23 also eliminating from the definition of 
%sT the requirement hat the involved posets be finite. Thus, if %sT is the resulting 
class of posets, we obtain also ST = Y(%sT). 
(c) Under our notion of poset, the class % of [16] coincides with the class %sT of 
the previous remark. On the other hand, if the property of the final elements is not 
required, one has %&, _ c 9. However, since the soundness theorem holds for 9, one 
has ST = _Y(%) also in this case. 
(d) If H is any formula, then we are no longer able to prove that VL(f )/ = H is built 
on a poset of %sT; in other words, to prove the completeness theorem for ST by means 
of the quotient models technique, we need special filtration formulas such as the 
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extensively complete ones. On the other hand, with a proof slightly more complex 
than the one given in Theorem 10, we can provide the completeness of ST using 
arbitrary filtration formulas in connection with the selective models technique to be 
explained in the second part of the paper. 
6. Maximal constructive logics extending ST 
In this section we give examples of progressive xtensions of ST, which are carried 
out until a constructive logic L is reached such that the corresponding nonstandard 
regular logic E(L) can be shown to be a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. The 
progressive xtensions of ST are made, on the syntactical ground, by introducing new 
axiom schemes and give rise, from the semantical point of view, to progressive 
restrictions of the class FsT of frames. From an heuristic point of view, the main 
interest is involved in the progressive restrictions of the class of frames. The final goal 
is to reach a logic L characterized by a class of frames 9 with a subclass 9’ E .a of 
(finite) “canonical frames” such that U,,,(9) = Y’,,e(,9c) and the elements of 9’ 
satisfy properties of this kind: if P E 9’ has an appropriate number of final states and 
K is a regular Kripke model built on P, then the final states of K together with the 
forcing defined on them uniquely determine K. 
The first extensions are made by introducing the following axiom schemes: 
(EST,): ((1-1Ar -+lAz VT-IA, v ... v-tA,vl-tA,) 
--) 1lAl VllAzV ... VllA,) 
+-I-IA~ viiAz v ... viiA,, for any n >, 2 
(with A,, AZ, . . . . A, any formulas). 
We are interested in the logics ST + {(EST,)}, we call EST, (n-extended ST). For 
every n 2 2, the class of frames 5:~s-r. for the logic EST, is so defined: 
_ P = (P, d ) E .FEs~. iff P is finite and, for every cx and distinct c#J~, . . , &,, E P with 
2 < m < n, if {$,....,&,} E Fin(r) then there is PEP such that cx < fi, /I is 
prefinal and {c#J,, . . . ,&,,} G Fin@). 
One easily sees that FtEST I c_ .9rsT, hence ST E Y(.q~srJ (for every n 2 2). One 
also has: 
Proposition 24. EST, 2 Y(9~sr,). 
Proof. The assumption of the contrary yields the existence of wK’s A,, . . . , A,, 
a Kripke model K = (P, 6 , IF) built on a P = (P, 6 ) E 9;~s~. and states 
~,~#~~,~#~~,...,~#~~~Psuchthatalt(-~~A, +TA~v-I-IA~v ~~~v~A,v~~A,)+ 
liAl viiA2v ... ~iiA,,~,l~iA,,~~ItiA~ ,..., &It-rA,and {c#Q,& ,..., 
4.) s Fin(r) (&r&r... ,4. are not necessarily distinct). Since P E .FEs~., there is 
/I E P such that a < /3, /? is prefinal and { c$,, . . . ,&} E Fin@). It follows that 
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fik(llA1 +lA~VllA~v '.. VlA,VllA,)-+l1A~ VllAzV ... v 
llA, and /?Il%lAi. Since /3 is prefinal, the latter fact gives j3 It 11 A1 + 
lA, vllAz v . . . V-IA, v 11A,, which implies, by the above, j?ItllA1 v 
T-IA, v ... v -11 A,,, which gives rise to a contradiction. 0 
We also have the following theorem, whose proof makes an essential use of the fact 
that ST c EST,,: 
Theorem 11. Zf L is any nonstandard logic such that EST, c L (n 3 2), W is any 
extensively completeformula and r is any L-saturated set, then the poset P’ = (P’, < ‘) 
on which qx,(T)/ E w is built belongs to FEsT,. 
Proof. By Theorem 10, we can start from the fact that P’ E 5sT, We prove the 
theorem by induction on n 2 2. 
Step: n = 2. Suppose that the assertion of the theorem does not hold. Then in P’ 
there are states [A], [Q1] and [&I such that Fin([d]) 2 ([@r], [&I}, but, for 
every [0] such that [A] <‘[@I and Fin([O]) 2 {[@i-J, [Qz]}, CO] is not prefinal. 
Since P’ is finite, we can furtherly assume, without loss of generality, that [d] satisfies 
the following property: for every [0] of P’ such that [A] <‘[@I and [A] # [O], 
Fin(C@l) 2 {C@II, C@)ZI) d oes not hold. As said above, being ST c L, by Theorem 
10 the poset P’ turns out to belong to SST. It follows, by the previous hypotheses, that 
in P’ there is [&I different from [@i] and [Qz] such that [Q3] E Fin([d]) (other- 
wise, [@i ] and [@J could not be prefinally connected in the cone PIAl). Also, we can 
assume, without loss of generality, that in P’ there is a prefinal state [n] such that 
[d] <‘CL’] and {[Qz], [Q3]) E Fin([L’]) (where, of course, [Q1]#Fin([n])). 
Starting from these hypotheses and along the usual lines, we can select two wlf’s 
B and C of Sf,,, +,,(W) such that [@l]l#‘llB and [Y] It’llB for every 
[Y]~Fin([d]) different from [Q1], [<p2]II”llC and [!P]lt’~lC for every 
[Y] E Fin([d]) different from [&] (where It’ is the forcing of gL(r)/= w). 
With these positions, one has that [ZI] It-‘1~ B and [LI] If’1 C v 11 C, which 
implies [LI] If’11 B -+ 1 C v 11 C. Thus, any [0] such that [d] <‘[@I and 
[0] It’ll B -+ 1 C v 11 C must satisfy [O] It’ll B or [0] II-‘11 C (by the 
properties of [d] and the definitions of B and C); it follows that 
[A]I~-‘(~~B+~CV~~C)-~~~BV~~C. On the other hand, since W is 
extensively complete (hence negatively complete), we can assume, without loss of 
generality, that 1 C v 11 C and 11 B v 11 C are subformulas of W, from which 
Z=((~~B~~C~~~C)~~~B~~~C)~~~B~~~CES~,,,,,(W); 
being d It2 in gL(r), by Proposition 18 we get [d] IF’Z. It follows that 
[A] IF’11 B v 11 C, which gives rise to a contradiction. 
Step: n > 2. Since (EST,) is an axiom schema of L, one easily shows that also 
(EST,- 1) is an axiom schema of L, i.e., EST,_ 1 c L. Hence, we assume, as induction 
hypothesis, that P’ belongs to RnSrR_, . On the other hand, suppose that P’1$9~~r~_ 
Then inP’ there are states [LI], [@Jo], .. . ,[@.I such that {[Q1], . . . , [@,,I} E Fin([d]) 
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and, for every prefinal state [II] for which [A] <‘[II] holds, there is [@i] with 
1 < i < n such that [I@(] $Fin([n]). Since P’ is finite, we also assume, without loss of 
generality, that [A] satisfies the following condition: for every immediate successor 
[C] of [A] in P’, Fin([,X]) does not include {[QI], . . . , [IQ,,]}. Since P’ E PEST._,, we 
have, in addition, that in P’ there is a prefinal state [I?] such that [A] < [I?] and (e.g.) 
{C@zl, .. . . [CD,,]) c Fin([fi]), while, of course, [@‘l]$Fin([fi]). 
With these assumptions, we can select formulas B1, . . . , B, of Sf A( _ ,1 ( W) satisfy- 
ing the following properties: 
_ for every i, 1 < i < n, [@i] It'll Bi; 
- for every i and every [‘I’] E Fin([d]) such that [Y] # [@iI, [Y] II’llBi. 
The above implies that [I?] !t’llB1 and [fl] IV’iB2 v ilBz v ... v 
1 B, v 11 B,, which, taking into account the properties of [A] and arguing as in the 
above proof of the basis, yields [A] II’ (llB, --+-IB* vi1 B2 v ... v lB, v 
11&J+ llB, VllBZV ... v 11 B,. On the other hand, since (being W ex- 
tensively complete) i B2 v ii Bz v . . v~B,,v~~B,andl~B1v~~B,v ... v 
11 B, can be assumed to be subformulas of W, setting Z = ((11 B1 + 1 B2 v 
~~B2v~~~v~B,v~~B,)-,~~B1v~~Bzv~~~v~~B,)~1~B1v 
T-IB, v ... v 11 B, and arguing as in the proof of the basis, we get [A] Ik’ Z. It 
follows that [A] IF’11 B, v 11 B2 v . . . v 11 B,, which gives rise to a contradic- 
tion. [7 
From Proposition 24 and Theorem 11 we immediately obtain: 
Corollary 3. For every n > 2, EST, = di”(Y_~sr.). 
We define the logic EST (extended ST) setting EST = ST + u,, > 2 {(EST,)}. Since, 
as seen in the proof of Theorem 11, EST, E EST,+ 1 for every n >, 2, we have: 
Proposition 25. EST2 G EST3 E ... G EST,, G . . . E EST. 
To provide the semantics of the logic EST, we define the class prsr of frames as 
follows: 
-p EST = n n > 25;EST.. 
From Proposition 24 we obtain EST E _Y(9 rsr), while Theorem 11 immediately 
yields _!??(yrsr) c EST. Hence: 
COrOTiary 4. EST = c!? (FE$jT). 
It is easy to show that any 9asr. satisfies (s.d.e.p.) and that the same holds for 9r.r. 
Hence, by Proposition 13, we have: 
Proposition 26. For every n > 2, EST, is a constructive logic; EST is a constructive 
logic. 
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Remark. The above results on the logics EST,, and EST have been stated, without 
proof, in [15] (however, in [15] the intended proofs use arbitrary filtration formulas 
and are based on the selective models technique we will explain in the second part of 
the paper). 
Later we will consider, for every n > 2, a maximal constructive logic containing 
EST,, and constructively incompatible with EST,, for every m 2 2 such that m # n; 
such a logic, of course, is constructively incompatible also with EST. Now, we want to 
extend EST into a maximal constructive logic. To do so, we introduce new axiom- 
schemes to be added to EST. 
First of all, we present wo following auxiliary schemes: 
(DEI): A v (A + B v -I@; 
(FIN,,): -1,4~ v (-1,4r +-IAJ v ... v(lA1 A ... ~lA,-i -+ lA,) v(lAi A ... A 
TA,_~ + -ITA,), with n > 2. 
Let 9oE, be the class of all the posets whose root is final or prefinal (i.e., the class of 
all the posets whose depth is at most 2, 1 being the depth of the final states), and let 
FFIN. be the class of all the posets having at most n final states. As is known [6,4] and 
can be easily shown using the method of the canonical models (filtrations are not 
necessary), one has: 
- INT + {(DE,)) = Y(~DE,); 
- INT + {(FIN,,)} = d;P(yF,N,). 
Using (DE2) and (FIN,,), we introduce the following axiom schemes: 
(5,): (-IA+~B~v~B,)+(DE~)‘v(FIN,)‘v~(~AAB~A~B~)v 
1(-l/i AlB, A&); 
(S,): (1A -+lBl v ... vlB,_l v(lB~+llB~v ... VllB,_,)) 
-+(DE2)'v(FIN,_1)'vl(~~A&Al&A ... AT&-~)v ... vl(lz‘iA 
lB1 r\l&A ... A l&z A &-I), 
with n 2 4. 
In the axiom-schemes (SJ) and (5,) the subformulas (DE2)‘, (FIN2)’ and (FIN,_ i)’ 
represent any instances of the axiom schemes (DE,), (FIN2) and (FIN,_ 1) introduced 
above. 
We also define the following classes of posets: 
- 9s, will be the class of all the finite posets P = (P, d ) such that, for every 
a,&,& EP with $Q Z &, the following holds: if c1 is not prefinal, and 
1 Fin(cc)( 2 3, and {4i, c#J~) s Fin(a), then there is a (possibly prefinal) /I E P such 
that u < /I and Fin(p) = { 4i, 42}. 
- For every n B 4, F,s” will be the class of all the finite posets P = (P, < ) such that, 
for every IX E P and distinct final states ~$i, .. . , & 1, the following holds: if CI is not 
prefinal, and lFin(a)( 3 n, and {c#J~,...,&~} c Fin(a), then there is /?E P such 
that cL d /I, and /I is not prefinal, and Fin(P) = {4,, . . . ,&_i}. 
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We now introduce the (auxiliary) logic L,,, by setting L,,, = INT + Un B 3 {(S,)}. 
We also set %L,U, = r),, 3 3%s.. We have: 
Proposition 27. L,,, G _!Z(%L,~,). 
Proof. We have to show that every instance of (S,) is forced in every state of every 
Kripke model built on a poset of %_L,,,, for every n 2 3. 
To prove the assertion for (S,), assume the contrary. Then there is a Kripke model 
K = (P, d ,k) such that P = (P, < ) E %L.U,, a state c1 E P, formulas A,B1,B,, an 
instance (DE,)’ of (DE,) and an instance (FIN2)’ of (FIN,) such that 
aIkiA +iB1 vi&, aIV(DE,)‘, ccIV(FIN,)‘, aI1’i(iA A B1 A~J&) and 
CI til(l A A 1 B1 A B2). It follows, on the one hand, that ~1 is not prefinal (since 
a #(DE,)‘) and 1 Fin(a)) 3 3 (since a IV(FIN,)‘), on the other hand that there are 41 
and C#J~ such that {c$~,&} E Fin(m), 411k-rA, C#J~ II-&, @i ItlB,, 421t-lA, 
& ItlB, and & Ik B2 (hence C#Q # &). By the properties of %L,UX E %s3, there is 
fi such that c( d /I and Fin(j) = {41r &}. Since filt--~A and flIVIB1 and /IIVlB2 
easily follows, one has fl lb’1 A + 1 Z3i v 1 B2, a contradiction. 
Now, assume that n B 4 and that some instance of (S,) is not forced on some state 
of some Kripke model built on a poset of %L8,X. Then, arguing as above, we have 
K = (P, <, It-) such that P = (P, G ) E %L.U,, a nonprefinal a E P such that 
[Fin(a)1 2 n,distinctfinalstates~,,...,~,_,suchthat{~1,...,~,_1} c Fin(a),and 
WfYS 4Bl,...,B,-l such that aItiA + iB1 v ... VlB,_1V(lB1 --+ 
ll& v ... vllB,_,),~iItlA,~iItBiand~iI~Bjfor 1 < i,j < n - 1 andi # j. 
By the properties of %L,,, G %s,, there is b E P such that a Q /fk fl is not prefinal and 
Fin(B) = (4 l,...,~,_,}.Ofcourse,bytheabove,fll~lAand/?I~~B, V-I&V ... v 
lB,_1. On the other hand, 1 Fin@) ) = n - 1 2 3, /I is not prefinal and 
% L,,, c_ 9s n_ i. It follows, by the properties of 9s”. , , that there is y such that j? d y 
and Fin(y) = {&, . . . , $,_l).Then,yltlB1 andyl)ill&v ... vllB,_,,which 
implies, by the above, PHiA +lB1 v . . . v~B,-~ v(lB, +ll& v ... v 
11 B,- i ). This gives rise to a contradiction. 0 
Now we can prove: 
Theorem 12. Let L be any nonstandard logic such that L,,, c L, let r be an L- 
saturated set and let W be any extensively complete formula. Then gL(r)/ z w is built 
on a poset P’ = (P’, <’ ) of %I_. 
Proof. We will give only the proof that, for any n >, 4, gL(r)/ = w is built on a poset 
of %s.. As matter of fact, the proof that wL(r)/ = w is built on a poset of %ss, is similar, 
but easier (it depends on the axiom schema (S,), instead of the axiom schemes (S,) 
with n > 4). 
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Now, let n 3 4 and let us assume that P’ is not built on a poset of Fs”. Then, there 
are states [A], [@iI, . . . , [Qn_ 1] of P’ such that: 
- [A] is not prefinal; 
- IFin([Al)I > n; 
- Fin(C4) 2 {[%I, ...,C@n-ll}; 
-foreverystate[@]suchthat[A] <‘[@]inp’andFin([O])= ([@l],...,[@n_l]}, 
[0] is prefinal in P’. 
By the finiteness of P’, we furtherly assume, without loss of generality, that [A] 
satisfies the following property: 
- for every [0] such that [A] 6 ’ [0] and [A] # [ 01, 
either 
(a) Fin(C@l) 2 {C@J, . . . . [@,_l]} and [0] is prefinal in P’ 
or 
(b) FinK@l) 1 {[%I, . . ..[Qnml]} does not hold. 
Now, as usual, we can choose wff’s A, Bi, . . . , B,- 1 of Sf,, --1,1 (H) such that, for 
every i with 1 < i d n - 1, the following conditions hold, where 11’ is the forcing of 
g,(r)/ = w: 
-[pi] It'lA; 
- [~i]It’Bi; 
- if [Y] E Fin([A]) and [Y] # [Qi], then [Y] Ik’l Bi; 
-if[Y]~Fin([A])and[Y]#{[@,],...,[@,_,]}, then [Y]lt’A. 
With these assumptions, we prove that A It 1 A + 1 B1 v ... v 1 B,_ 1 v 
(TB, -+ TTB, v ... vllB,_,) in VL(r). 
To do so, let A’ be such that A < A’ and A’lti A (in VL(r)). Then, from the above, 
one gets A f H A’, since A IhA, as a consequence of Proposition 18 and of the fact 
that in P’ there is [Y] E Fin([A’]) such that [Y]#{[@l},...,[@,,_l]} (we have 
IFin([A])j > n); iffollows that [A] <‘[A’] and [A] # [A’]. Let [C] be an immedi- 
ate successor of [A] in P’ such that [C] <‘[A’]. We have some cases, depending on 
whether Condition (a) or Condition (b) is satisfied setting [C] = [O]. 
Case 1. Fin([Z]) = {[@iI, . . ..[@._i]} and [C] is prefinal. 
Here we have that either [A’] is a final state of P’ or [A’] = [Cl. If [A’] is final, then 
[A’] E{[@~],...,[@~_~]} (by definition of A), from which A’IF-IB, + 
--mBzv ... v 11 B, _ 1 easily follows, using the properties of B1, . . . , B,_ 1 and Prop- 
osition 18. On the other hand, if [A’] = [C] then we have again 
A’II-IB~ +llB2 v ... v 11 B,_ 1. As a matter of fact, 52 II’1 B1 for every Q such 
that A’ <‘sZ and A’ zH 52 (since in P’ Fin([Q]) = {[Gil, . . . ,[@n_l]}, from which, 
[s;Z] 11”~ B1); moreover, if A’ Q’Q and A’ f H 52 then [Q] is final in P’, from which, by 
Proposition 18 and the properties of B1, . . . , B,, Szlt’l B1 or 52 It-11 B2 v ... 
v~~B,-~. Thus, in Case 1 we always have A’lti B1 + 11 B2 v ... vi1 B,_ 1. 
Case 2. Fin([Z]) properly contains {[@iI, . . . ,[@,_i]} and [Z] is prefinal. 
Here, since C 11'1 A (following from [C] IV’1 A) and A’ It 1 A, one has that [A’] is 
a final element of P’, hence (being A’ It 1 A) [A’] E { [QI], . . , [@,_ 1]}. It follows, as 
above, that A’k~B1 -+ ilBz v . . . ~iiB,,_~. 
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Case 3. Fin([Z]) 2 {[@l],...,[@n_l]} does not hold. 
Here there is i, 1 < i d n - 1, such that [@ii] 4 Fin([Z]). Then, since A’ IF 1 A, 
from the properties of A one obtains Fin([A’]) c {[Q1], . . ..[@“_i]} - {[@I}. It 
follows A’I~lBi, hence A’ItlBi v ... VTB,_~. 
Combining Cases l-3 we get the desired proof that A IklA --+ 
lB1 v .‘* vlBB,_1 v (lB1 + l-l& v ... v llB,_ 1) in VL(r). Hence, we have 
AIt-(DEI)‘v(FIN,_l)‘v~(~A~B1 r\-rB,r\ ... A-I&,)v ... vl(lAA 
iB1 A lBZ A ... A-I&-~ A B,_,) in VL(r), where (DE,)’ and (FIN,_l)’ are 
arbitrary instances of the axiom-schemes (DE,) and (FIN,_ 1) respectively. Since 
[A] is not prefinal in P’, and W is extensively complete, then one can show that A 
is not prefinal in the poset on which qL(r) is built; hence it is not difficult to 
choose an instance (DE,)” of (DE,) such that A #(DE,)” (we leave the details to 
the reader). Likewise, since 1 Fin([A])J > n in P’, it is not difficult to choose an 
instance (FIN,_l)” of (FIN,_l) such that Al~(FIN,_,)“. It follows that 
Alkl(-~A AB1 AlB2 A ... AlB,_,)V ... Vl(lA AlB, AlB2 A ... A 
1 B, _ 2 A B,_ 1 ). From the latter fact and the properties of [A], A, B1, . . . , B, _ 1, one 
easily gets a contradiction. 0 
Combining Proposition 27 and Theorem 12, we obtain that L,,, = _Y(5r-L,,,). Also, 
it is easily seen that F;L,,, satisfies (s.d.e.p.), so that L,,, is constructive. However, we 
are not particularly interested in the logic L,,, alone. We introduce, on the other hand, 
the logic CEST (completed EST) and the class FcEsT of frames as follows: 
- CEST = EST + L,,,; 
- FCEST = FEST n FL_’ 
Combining Propositions 24 and 27 and Theorems 11 and 12, we obtain that 
CEST = Y(FcEsT) and, since FcEST is easily seen to satisfy (s.d.e.p.), that CEST is 
a constructive logic. But the logic in which we are really interested is the (nonstan- 
dard) regular logic E(CEST). Combining Propositions 19,24 and 27 and Theorems 8, 
11 and 12, we get: 
Corollary 5. E(CEST) = Y,,,(5FcEsT). 
Combining Propositions 9 and 19 and Theorems 11 and 12, we also have: 
Corollary 6. For every nonstandard logic L such that E(CEST) G L, for every exten- 
sively complete formula W and for every L-saturated set r, VJL(r)/ z ,+, is a regular 
Kripke model built on a poset of BCEsT. 
We now single out a nice subclass of FcEsT and show that it is sufficient to 
characterize E(CEST). 
First of all, we inductively define the notion of m-CEST-almost-canonical state c( of 
aposetP=(P, d),foreverym> 1: 
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(1) If tl E P is a final state of P, then a is a 1-CEST-almost-canonical state of P. 
(2) If a E P is a prefinal state of P and (Fin(a)1 = 2, then a is a 2-CEST- 
almost-canonical state of P. 
(3) Let a E P be such that a is not prefinal and Fin(a) = {&, . . . ,&,I. Let m > 2 
and let Yi = (41, ...,&m} - {4i} for 1 < i 6 m. We say that a is a m-CEST-almost- 
canonical state of P iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
_ a has exactly m + 1 immediate successors /?i, . . . , fl,,,, y in P; 
- for every i, 1 < i 6 m, Fin@) = Yi and pi is a (m - l)-CEST-almost-canonical 
state of P; 
- Fin(y) = {41, . . . ,&} and y is prefinal. 
(4) The only m-almost-canonical states of P are the ones satisfying one of the 
conditions (lH3). 
Now, let P = (P, < ) be a poset and let a E P be a m-CEST-almost-canonical state 
of P. We say that a is a m-CEST-canonical state of P iff the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
_ Let Y be any nonempty subset of Fin(a) and let ) 9 1 = h < m. Then there is a 
unique /? E P such that a < fi, Fin@) = 9 and B is a h-CEST-almost-canonical 
state of P. 
- Let 9 be any subset of Fin(a) such that 2 6 ( 9 ( = h < m. Then there is a unique 
y E P such that a < y, Fin(y) = 4 and y is prefinal in P. 
Having defined the m-CEST-canonical states, we introduce the class F&sT of 
posets as follows: 
-F:” 
CEST = {P = (P. ., <: 0) 1 P is finite, and 0 is prefinal in P or 0 is a m-CEST- 
canonical state of P for some m 3 1). 
Fig. 1 illustrates the five immediate successors 15,16,17, 18 and 19 of the root 20 of 
the (uniquely determined up to isomorphisms) nonprefinal element P of F&sT with 
the four final states 1, 2, 3 and 4. Notice that P has 20 states, among which 19 is the 
Fig. 1. 
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prefinal immediate successor of the root and 15, 16, 17 and 18 are the four 3-CEST- 
canonical states of P. Notice also that the cones of 15 and 16 have in common the 
2-CEST-complete (and prefinal) state 5, the cones of 15 and 17 have in common 
the 2-CEST-complete (and prefinal) state 6, and so on. 
One immediately has: 
Proposition 28. d& E FcEST. 
To show that E(CEST) = JZreg(9&sT.), we recall the well known notion of open 
epimorphism [16] between two posets (another name for this notion, more frequent in 
literature, is p-morphism): 
- Let P = (P, d ) and P’ = (P’, <‘) be two posets, and let 6: P + P’ be a surjective 
application of P on P’. We say that d is an open epimorphism qf P in P’ iff the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
~ if CI d /3 then &(a) <‘&(/I); 
- if &(a) <‘fl’ then there is /I E P such that a < /I and &(/I) = ,!I’ 
The following fact is well known [ 161 and can be easily proved by induction on A : 
Proposition 29. Let v be any nonempty set of propositional variables, and let 
K = (P, < , II-) and K’ = (P’, <‘, It’) be two Kripke models. Let 8 be an open epimor- 
phism of the poset P = (P, ,< ) in the poset P’ = (P’, <‘) satisfying the following 
property: for every 01 E P and every p E v, all-p iff &(ol) It’p. Then, for every a E P and 
every wff A containing only variables of v, CI t A ifs b(a) Jt- ’A. 
Let K = (P, Q ,O, Ik) and K’ = (P’, < ‘,O’,It’) be two Kripke models such that: 
-P=(P, <,0)~9c~s~andP’=(P’, <‘,O’)E.~&; 
- )Fin(0)pI = IFin(O’)P’); 
- either both 0 and 0’ are prefinal states (of P and P’, respectively), or both 0 and 0’ are 
not prefinal states (of P and P’ respectively). 
Also, let v be any nonempty set of propositional variables. We say that the 
application d: P + P’ is a v-CEST-canonical application ofK in K’ iff d satisfies the 
following conditions: 
(i) Let d, be a final state of P. Then b(4) is a final state of P’. 
(ii) If 41 and & are two different final states of P, then F($,) # a(&). 
(iii) If a E P and Fin(a)p = { 4) f or some (single) final state 4 of P, then 
Q’(a) = &($). 
(iv) Let a E P and let Fin(a)p = {4,,$1~}, with +i # &. Let a’ be the unique 
prefinal state of P’ such that Fin(a’)p = {b(4,), &(42)}. Then &(a) = a’. 
(v) Let a be a prefinal state of P, and let Fin(a)p = { 41, . . . , c#J.}, with n 2 3. Let a’ 
be the unique element ofP’ such that a’ is prefinal and Fin(a’h,, = {B(4,), . . . ,J?(b,)}. 
Then 6(a) = x’. 
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(vi) Let a be a nonprefinal element of P such that Fin(cr)p = { 4r, . . . ,&} and n > 3. 
Let tl’ be the unique &EST-canonical state of P’ such that Fin(Cr’lp = 
{b(4,), . . . ,8(&J}. Then J?(U) = tl’. 
(vii) For every c1 E P and every p E u, ~111 p (in K) iff B(a) Ik’p (in K’). 
Starting from the definition of 9 cEsT and %&, one easily states the two following 
propositions, whose proofs are left to the reader. 
Proposition 30. Let K = (P, <, IF) be a regular Kripke model such that 
P = (P, < > E FCEST’ and let v be any nonempty set of propositional variables. Then 
there is a Kripke model K = (P’, < ‘, II’), together with an application d: P -+ P’, such 
that: 
(1) P’ = (P’, <’ > E F&sT and P’ is uniquely determined up to isomorphisms; 
(2) d is a v-CEST-canonical application of K in K’. 
Proposition 31. Let K = (P, d , II-) and K’ = (P’, <‘, It-‘) be two Kripke models such 
that P = (P, d > E FCEST and P’ = (P’, <‘> E .F&. Let v be a nonempty set of 
propositional variables and let E be a v-CEST-canonical application ofK in K. Then d is 
an open epimorphism of P in P’ such that, for every a E P and every p E v, a I!- p (in K) iff 
b(cr) It’p (in K’). 
Now we can prove: 
Theorem 13. E(CEST) = _Yr,,(F&sT). 
Proof. From Proposition 28 we immediately obtain E(CEST) = ,4”,,,(ptcEsT) G 
2*,,(%EST). 
On the other hand, let A 4 ~iprep(~c-sT ) and let u be the set of all the variables of A. 
Let K = (P, <, 0, IF) be a regular Kripke model such that P = (P, < ,O) E FcEsT 
and 0 WA, according to the above. Let K’ = (P’, 6’, 0’, It’) and d be, respectively, 
a regular Kripke model such that P’ = (P’, 6’, 0’) E F& and a v-CEST-canonical 
application of K in K’. Note that x’ and d exist by Proposition 30 and that K’ is 
regular (the forcing of the regular Kripke models is uniquely determined by the forcing 
on the final states). 
Now, by Proposition 31, Q is an open epimorphism of P in P’ such that GI tp iff 
G?(X) Ik’p, for every CI E P and every p E u. Since 0’ = &‘(O) and 0 #A, by Proposition 29 
we get 0’ I,’ ‘A, which implies, being K’ regular, that A 4 .Y*,,(g&). 0 
Remarks. (a) Starting from the fact that VL(r)/ = W is a regular Kripke model built 
on a poset of FcEST, for E(CEST) c L, P a L-saturated set and W an extensively 
complete formula, one can directly show: if L is a nonstandard logic such that 
E(CEST) E L, P is a L-saturated set and W is an extensively complete formula, then 
U,(P)/ = ,+, is built on a poset of 4&. 
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(b) Even if 3&3%sr) = diPreg(9cEST), we have not 9(9&) = .9’(9rcrsr) = 
CEST, as we will furtherly discuss later. 
Since 9&sT (as well as Pcrsr) satisfies (s.d.e.p.), we have: 
Proposition 32. E(CEST) is a nonstandard constructive logic. 
Now we show: 
Theorem 14. E(CEST) is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. 
Proof. Let L be any nonstandard constructive logic such that E(CEST) c_ L. Sup- 
pose that E(CEST) # L. Then there is a formula A E L such that A$ E(CEST). Let 
{P 1, . . . ,p,} be the set of all the propositional variables of A, and let 
{P 1%.4”) = {P 1 ,..., p,}ifm&2and{p, ,... ,p,} = {pl,pz} ifm = 1. Let W beany 
extensively complete formula containing the subformula A A (pi v (pi --) p2 v 1~~)) 
andsuchthatVW = {pi,... ,p,}. Since E (CEST) is a constructive logic, E(CEST) itself 
is a E(CEST)-saturated set of formulas. As a consequence, the canonical model 
VE(,,,,,(E(CEST)) is defined. Likewise, since L is constructive, L is a L-saturated set 
of formulas and the canonical model 9YL(L) is defined (we also have, being 
E(CEST) c L, that L is a E(CEST)-saturated set, so that GT?~(L) coincides with 
gEC,--sTj(L) and becomes a submodel of VE(cEST)(E(CEST))). 
Now, let us consider the two models CeE(cEsT)(E(CEST))/ = W and %TL(L)/ z w. Let 
Ki = (PI, d 1, Oi,lkr) =~~(cEsT)(E(CEST))I-- and K2 = (P2, d2,02,1k2) = 
VL(L)I = iv. Then, first of all we have that the set of final states of K1 and the set of 
final states of K2 coincide and correspond to the 2” classical interpretations of the 
variables pl, . . . ,p,, . For, every such a final state defines (in the obvious way) a classical 
interpretation of pl, . . . , pn. On the other hand, suppose that there is a classical 
interpretation I of pl, . . . , pn such that the corresponding final state (i.e., a state forcing 
pi if Z(pi) = T, and forcing lpi if I(pi) = F, for 1 < i 6 n) is not a state Of Kj, with 
j = 1 orj = 2. If H, is the formula fil A ... A $. with p*i = pi if I@;) = T, and pi = 1 pi 
if I(pi) = F (for 1 < i d n), we therefore have that all the final states Of Kj force 1 Hr. 
It follows that the root of Kj forces 1 HI. Since 1 HI E Sf ,,, _ ,- ( W), the latter fact 
implies that the root of %?L,(Lj) forces 1 HI, Lj being E(CEST) ifj = 1 and being L if 
j = 2. But 1 HI is not a classical tautology, while Lj, being a nonstandard logic, 
contains only classical tautologies. A contradiction. 
Now, we show that, for j = 1 or j = 2, the root Oj of the poset Pj on which Kj is built 
is not prefinal. For otherwise, Ojltjpr v (pl + p2 v 1~2) holds in Kj, since 
p1 v (pl -+ p2 v 1p2) is an instance of the axiom-schema (DE,). Since p1 v 
(pl + pz v lp2) E Sf,, _,7( W) by definition of our W, we obtain p1 v 
(pl + p2 v lpz) E Lj, which implies (since p1 is not a classical tautology) that 
p1 + p2 v 1p2 E Lj. Since Lj is closed under arbitrary restricted substitutions, 
we get, e.g., ll(B + B) -+1p2 v11p2 E Lj. Hence, being ll(B + B) E Lj, 
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1 p2 v llp2 e Lj by modus ponens. Since neither 1 p2 nor 11 p2 is a classical 
tautology, and Lj is a nonstandard constructive logic, this gives rise to a contradiction. 
We have therefore proved that Ki and K2 have the same 2” = k final states with the 
same forcing, and that their roots are not prefinal states. Thus, by Proposition 30, 
we can take a regular Kripke model f = (P, <* , &PA) such that ,. 
p = (P, <I, 0) E 9& and 0 is a k-CEST-canonical state ofp, and two applications 
gl:P1 + P and g2:P2 + P such that: 
_ di is a {pi, . . . ,p,}-CEST- canonical application K1 in K; 
_ F2 is a {pl, . . . , p,}-CEST-canonical application of K2 in K. 
Since A E Sf,, _+7 (W) and A$E(CEST), we have Oi IV1 A(in K,), which implies, by 
Propositions 29-31,6 If-‘A (in K). The latter fact, still by Propositions 29-31, implies 
O2 If2 A (in K2). Hence, being A E Sf,, + ,7 (W), A# L, a contradiction, 0 
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 14 an essential use has been made of the fact that 
the logic L 2 E(CEST) is closed under restricted substitutions. On this aspect we will 
come back later. 
From Theorems 5 and 14 we immediately deduce: 
Corollary 7. S(E(CEST)) is a maximal constructiue logic. 
We are interested in giving a semantical characterization of the logic S(E(CEST)), 
i.e., in showing that this logic coincides with _?Z’(Y&). To do so, in order to apply 
Theorem 9, we prove the two following propositions. 
Proposition 33. Let P = (P, < ,O) E B& and let u E P be a prefinal state ofP. Then 
there is a set V= of propositional variables, together with a negatively saturated formula 
H, containing only variables of V=, and a forcing It’ on the jinal states of P for the 
variables of V= such that the following holds: for every Kripke model K = (P, d , It-) 
such that K is built on P and theforcing It coincides with It’ on thejinal states ofPfor the 
variables of Y,, M It H, and, for every j3 E P such that fi is notJina1 and a # 8, b Ir’H,. 
Proof. Let Fin(a) = {4i, . . . ,$,} (with n > 2) and let +i, . . . ,ll/h be all the final states 
of P (where, of course, { &, . . . ,&) c {1(/I, . . . ,$,}). We select the distinct variables 
Pl, ... ,pn,q1,...,qh,rl,...,rn,andset~~=(pl,...,p,,q,,...,qh,r1,...,r,}.Now,let 
H,‘, Hi and H, be the wff’s so defined: 
-Hi = (lpl + lql v ... vlq,,) A ... r\(lp, -+1q1 v ‘.. v1qjJ; 
- Hz = lrl v (lrI + lr2) v ... v (lrl A ... A1r,_l +lr,) v (lrl A ... A 
ir,_ 1 + iir,) (Hz is an instance of the axiom schema (FIN,,)); 
-H,=H:r\H:. 
We define IF’ to be any forcing on the final states of P satisfying the following 
conditions: 
- for every j, 1 d j < n, +j Ik’pj, and, for every k with 1 < k < n and k # j, 
+k Ik’lPj; 
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-f#~~l~'r~,c#~~It'ir~~r~ ,..., ~,lt’irlA...Air,_lAr,; 
-for every j, 1 d j < h, $jIl-‘lqj, and, for every k with 1 < k < h and k #j, 
-forevery$E (I++~,...,$,,} - {f#~r,...,&),$l~‘ir~ A ... r\ir,,and,foreveryjwith 
1 < j < n, ~It’lpj. 
Now, let K = (P, 6 , lb) be any Kripke model built on P such that IF coincides with 
It’ on the final states of P for the variables of V‘,. With these positions, it is easy to 
show that M It H, in K. 
On the other hand, let p E P such that fl is not final and fl # a. If /I is prefinal, then, 
by the properties of 9&r, Fin(p) # Fin(a). In this case, if Fin(a) s Fin(P), then 
there is II/ E Fin(P) such that $$Fin(cr), which implies /.?IfH~, hence /I IfEZ,. If p is 
prefinal and Fin(u) E Fin(P) does not hold, then there is 4i with 1 $ i < n such that 
(PigFin( it foll ows that fl It1 pi, from which, since /I It’1 q1 v ... v 1 qh (as a conse- 
quence of the fact that IFin( 2 2), one gets /I IVlpi -+ lql v a.. vlq,, which 
implies p If H,’ , which implies /I It H,. If p is not prefinal, since p is not final too, we 
have 1 Fin(P)! > 3. Here, if Fin@) # Fin(m) and Fin(a) c Fin(b), then, as before, one 
gets /I If Hz, hence p IfH,; also, if Fin(a) G Fin(P) does not hold, then, as before, 
BI)‘lpi ~ 141 V ... Vi& for some i with 1 < i < n, hence jlfHb, hence /IlVH,. 
It remains to consider the case where b is not prefinal and Fin@) = Fin(m). 
In the latter case, being 1 Fin( > 3, by the properties of 9& there is y E P 
such that p 6 y and Fin(y) = {4r,...,$._r}; it follows that yIl%p, -+ 
141 v ... vi&,, hence /?lb’Hi, hence /II)‘&. 0 
Proposition 34. Let P = (P, <, 0) e 9 EEST and let CI E P. Then there is a set VU of 
propositional variables, together with a negatively saturatedformula H, containing only 
variables of Vd, and a forcing It’ on theJina1 states ofPfor the variables of V= such that 
thefollowing holds:for every Kripke model K = (P, d , It) such that K is built on P and 
theforcing It coincides with 11’ on theJina1 states ofPfor the variables of V’=, a IF H, and, 
for every /? E P such that a < /3 does not hold, b’ IF H,. 
Proof. If a is prefinal, then the assertion follows from Proposition 33. 
If a is not prefinal, then a is m-CEST-canonical for m = 1 or m 2 3. Here we set 
+‘a = {p} and H, = -11 p, while Ik’ will be any forcing such that $I 11’ p iff I$ E Fin(a). 
If K = (P, 6 , It ) is any Kripke model built on P whose forcing It coincides with Ik’ 
on the final states of P with respect o p, we trivially have a It H,. On the other hand, if 
/I E P and a 6 /? does not hold then a If H,, since we cannot have Fin (fi) c Fin (a). As 
a matter of fact, if Fin(p) G Fin(a) and a d /? does not hold, then, by the properties 
of 9&, a is prefinal, a contradiction. 0 
From Proposition 34 we obtain: 
Theorem 15. U(F&-) is neg.sat.-determined. 
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Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there is a wff A such that, for every negatively 
saturated substitution gns, o,,A E _.Y(&&), while A $_5?(9&). It follows that there 
isaKripkemodelK=(P, d,O,lt)such thatP=(P, <,O)~~&andOlI1A. 
Let VA be the set of propositional variables of A, let p E VA and let CI E P. We say 
that c1 is initial for p iff CI t p and, for every B E P such that /I Q c1 and /I # CI, /I It’p. 
Now, for any p E %‘A such that IX 11 p for some c1 E P, let a$‘, .. . , ct$ (m 2 1) be all the 
states of P which are initial for p. Let, for 1 < i < m, Hf’ be a formula satisfying 
Proposition 34, replacing in that proposition the state CI with a!p and the formula H, 
with HF. We define the formula H, as follows: 
-H,=H$‘v...vH;. 
On the other hand, if p E VA and there is no tl E P such that tl IF p, we define HP as 
follows: 
- H, = T-I/I. 
Notice that, in any case, H, is a negatively saturated formula. We can assume, 
without loss of generality, that, if p # q and {p, q) E VA, then the variables occur- 
ring in H, are different from the variables occurring in Hq, and that, if 
H, = H$ v ... v H;, then the variables occurring in HP are different from the 
variables of HjP for 1 < i,j Q m and i # j. 
With these assumptions, let K’ = (P, <, 0, It’) be a Kripke model built on P in 
such a way that the following property holds: 
(i) for every p E V”,., and every CI E P, tr It’ H, iff there is a: such that ~14 is initial for 
p and c$ d ~1. 
Notice that such a forcing It’ can be defined, as a consequence of Proposition 34. 
Thus, let 6,, be a negatively saturated substitution so defined on the set of variables 
V-A: 
- for every p E VA, 8,,(p) = H, . 
Using (i), with an easy induction on the complexity of A we can prove: 
(ii) for every CI E P, c1 Ik A (in K) iff c( It-’ $,,A (in K’). 
It follows that 0 If-’ 8,, A, hence &,,,A +! 2’(F&), a contradiction. 0 
Finally, combining Corollary 7 and Theorems 13 and 15 with the key Theorem 9, 
we obtain: 
Corollary 8. ,S(E(CEST)) = 2(s&sT), 
Thus, our method has succeeded in providing a Kripke frames semantics for the 
maximal constructive logic S(E(CEST)). 
As said in a previous remark, we can find formulas of 5?(~&sT) which do not 
belong to 2’(scEST) = CEST. As an example, let us consider the axiom-schema 
(SCHEMA) so defined: 
(SCHEMA): (A+~F)A((BAC)V(BAD)V(CAD)-+FV~F) 
A((A+BvCVDVE) 
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where A, B, C, D, E and F are any formulas. 
Then every instance of (SCHEMA) belongs to _Y’(9&). On the other hand, if A, B, 
C, D, E and F coincide with the propositional variables p. q, I, s, t and U, respectively, 
then the corresponding instance of (SCHEMA) does not belong to CEST. 
To show that (SCHEMA) belongs to Y(9 &sr), assume the contrary. Then there 
is a Kripke model K = (P, <,It), together with a E P, such that 
P=(P, Q)E9&, a forces in K the antecedent of (SCHEMA) and 
a If A v B v C v D v E. Since (being (SCHEMA) a classical tautology) every element 
of Fin(a) forces (SCHEMA) and since P is a finite poset, without loss of generality we 
can suppose that all the immediate successors of a force A, or B, or C, or D, or E. 
Now, since a forces the antecedent of (SCHEMA), in particular we have that 
rlk(B+AvCvDvEv(E-+1F)) +AvCvDvE.Sincerl~AvCvDvE,it 
follows that alVB-+AvCvDvEv(E -+ 1 F), which implies the existence of 
/? 2 a such that rItB, /?lfA, fllfC, j?lfD, BIfE and PItiE -+-IF. Thus, there is an 
immediate successor fll of a such that PI It B, j?, IVA, PI If C, flI If 0, /I1 IfE and 
jY1 IVE --t 1 F. From /II l,‘E + 1 F we also get the existence of 7 E P and 4 E Fin(y) 
such that j?, < 7, ylt E and 411 F; it follows that /?r # 7, hence fi, is not final and 
there is 4 E Fin(fll) such that 4 It F. 
Likewise, taking into account (in the antecedent of (SCHEMA)) the formulas 
(C+AvBvDvE)+AvBvDvE, (D + AvBvCvE)-+ AvBvCvE, (E + 
AvBvCvD)+AvBvCvD and (A+BvCvDvE)+BvCvDvE, we can 
show the existence of immediate successors f12, f13, f14 and fl, of Q such that: fi2 It C, 
while flz 1,’ A, /I2 If B, /I2 If D, flz I,‘E; /I3 It D, while /I3 #A, /I3 Iti B, b3 If C, f13 If E; p4 It E, 
while p4 IV A, p4 If B, p4 If C, /I4 IV D; fis II A, while /3, lti B, /I5 If C, /I5 I): D, f15 If E. 
We have therefore proved that there are at least five distinct immediate successors of 
r, namely, /I,, p2, fi3, /II., and fls. Since P E 9’ C-ST, we get 1 Fin(a)1 > 4; moreover, 
since fl, is not final, a is not prefinal. Also, a It A + 1 F (since a forces the antecendet 
of (SCHEMA)); then, all the elements of Fin(jIs) force 1 F, while 4 E Fin(bl) and 
411 F. It follows that not all the elements of Fin(r) are elements of Fin@,), hence 
(being P E .7& and 1 Fin(r)1 > 4), p5 cannot be prefinal; furthermore (still by the 
properties of the elements of 9&), for every immediate successor 6 of r with 
6 # ps, 4 E Fin(G). Since IFin(a)l > 4, IFin(G)I nlFin(&)l 3 2 for every immediate 
successor 6 of a such that 6 # p5; hence, for every immediate successor 6 of a such 
that 6 # fls, there are at least two elements of Fin(G) forcing 1 F. Finally, by the 
properties of the elements of .# F&-r, r has exactly one prefinal immediate successor; 
hence. either both /I1 and /I1 are not prefinal, or both fl, and f13 are not prefinal, or 
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both /I& and /Z& are not prefinal. Suppose, without loss of generality, that /3r and /I2 are 
not prefinal. 
Now, since /?r and bZ are not prefinal, by the above discussion and the properties of 
the elements of %’ cEST, there is E E P such that fir < a, b2 < a, Q, E Fin(a), 
IFin(a)nFin(P5)1 3 1; it follows that aIt_BAC, but cIVFvlF, hence 
&Ili(BAC)V(BAD)V(CAD) -+ F V-I F, the latter formula being one of the con- 
juncts of the antecedent of (SCHEMA). This gives rise to a contradiction. 
To prove that if A, B, C, D, E and F coincide with the propositional variables p, q, r, 
s, t and U, respectively, then the corresponding instance of (SCHEMA) does not belong 
to CEST = .Z’(%cEST), consider the Kripke model of Fig. 2. 
It is readily seen that the Kripke model of Fig. 2 is built on a poset of %cEST and 
that 
Oiti(p+lZ4)A((qAJ-)V(qAS)V(rAS)+UVlU) 




We point out that %&sr (differently from %cEsT) is not closed under open 
epimorphisms, which implies that Ep(%&) properly contains B&r, where, for 
every nonempty class % of posets, by Ep(%) we denote {P/there is P’ E % together 
with an open epimorphism 6’ of P’ in P). Since, for every 9, one has 
Y(Ep(%)) = _!Z(%) (as one easily proves starting from Proposition 29, and as it is 
well known), it follows that %& is not the greatest class % of frames such that 
_5?(%) = S(E(CEST)). Such a % (which is easily proved to exist) stands between 
%_bsr and %,--sT (the latter being the greatest % such that CEST = Y(F)), but we 
do not know a characterization of &. 
Fig. 2. 
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From this point of view, consider the application of filtration methods such as the 
ones used in this paper. Let L be a logic syntactically characterized by a set of 
axiom-schemes and let 9 be a class of posets for which L = Z(9) is to be proved; 
then, generally a completeness proof by filtration techniques amounts to prove that, 
for every P#9’, there is a Kripke model built on P whose root does not force some 
instance of some axiom-schema of L. In other words (instead of interpreting such 
a proof as a proof that a contradiction arises from the assumption that the filtration 
model obtained from the canonical model is built on a poset which does not belong to 
.q), we can look at a completeness proof as the construction of a counter-model _Gor 
someformula ofL (a counter-model whose underlying poset does not belong to P). As 
a consequence, generally a completeness proof is successful only if9 is the greatest 
class offrames for L. Thus, without a characterization of the greatest class 3 offrames 
for S(E(CEST)), no attempt of giving a recursive axiom&z&ion of S(E(CEST)) seems to 
be promising. 
A similar discussion could be made also for nonstandard logics. However, in this 
case particular properties of the involved models (due to the presence of the axioms 
-11p + p) may help in simplifying the structure of the frames, i.e., in restricting 
(under particular forcings) classes of frames into narrower classes (of “canonical” 
frames). In this sense, the above proof that E(CEST) = YiPreg(9&), where B& is 
not the greatest class of frames for E(CEST) (according to the conventions made for 
the nonstandard logics), has not been carried out using only filtration techniques (an 
essential role has been played by the properties of the regular Kripke models, which 
cannot be used in completeness proofs of standard logics). 
We end this illustration of the maximal constructive logic S(E(CEST)) by putting 
into evidence two important properties of the related maximal nonstandard construc- 
tive logic E(CEST). 
First of all, for every finite nonempty set of variables u = (pi, . . . ,p,}, let 
K, = (P, < , 0, It ) be a regular Kripke model so defined: 
- 0 is a 2”-CEST-canonical state of P = (P, <,O); 
- for every classical interpretation I of the variables p 1, . . . ,p,,, there is a final state 4 of 
P such that the forcing It on 4 for the variables pl, . . . ,p. coincides with 1. 
For the Kripke model K, one can easily prove: if A is any formula containing only 
variables of U, then 0 It A in K, ifs A E E (CEST). Thus, one has: 
Theorem 16. For every finite nonempty set u of propositional variables, E(CEST)- 
biimplication divides the set offormulas containing only variables of u into ajnite set of 
equivalence classes. 
For the second property of E(CEST), we recall that, to prove that any constructive 
nonstandard logic L 2 E(CEST) coincides with E(CEST), an essential use has been 
made of the fact that L is closed under restricted substitutions, as we have remarked 
after the proof of Theorem 14. It may be interesting to ask what happens when 
a L G CL and closed under modus ponens looses the closure under restricted 
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substitutions, till preserving constructiveness. In this line, we introduce the notions of 
pseudologic, constructive pseudologic and maximal constructive pseudologic. 
- We say that a set L of wffs is a pseudologic iff L satisfies the following properties: 
(i) INT E L and L c CL; 
(ii) L is closed under detachment. 
_ We say that L is a constructive pseudologic iff L is a pseudologic and satisfies the 
disjunction property. 
- We say that L is a maximal constructive pseudologic iff L is a constructive 
pseudologic and, for every constructive pseudologic L’, if L E L’ then L = L’. 
Of course, any nonstandard logic is pseudologic, and any nonstandard constructive 
logic is a constructive pseudologic. However, the converses do not hold, hence 
a maximal nonstandard constructive logic is not necessarily a maximal constructive 
pseudologic. According to the treatment of [14], it turns out that the maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic E(MV) is also a maximal constructive pseudologic. 
On the other hand, we are going to show that E(CEST) is not a maximal constructive 
pseudologic. To do so, the following definitions are needed. 
- We say that a wff A is classically well founded iff A E CL and one of the following 
conditions holds: 
(1) A =lB; 
(2) A = B A C, and A and B are classically well founded; 
(3) A = B v C, and A is classically well founded or B is classically well founded; 
(4) A = B + C, and if A is classically well founded then B is classically well founded. 
- WFCL will be the set of all the classically well founded formulas. 
One has that WFCL is closed under substitutions 0 of variables with variables or 
negated variables such that the following condition is satisfied: if p # q, then the 
variable occurring in a(p) is different from the variable occurring in cr(q). However, 
WFCL is not closed under substitutions of variables with arbitrary negated formulas. 
Hence: 
Proposition 35. WFCL is not a nonstandard logic. 
On the other hand, one easily proves: 
Proposition 36. WFCL is a constructive pseudologic. 
Finally, we have: 
Proposition 37. WFCL is a maximal constructive pseudologic. 
Proof. One has to show that if WFCL E L and L is a constructive pseudologic, then, 
for every wff A, A E WFCL iff A E L. The proof of this fact is an easy induction on the 
complexity of A. 0 
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For every finite nonempty set u of propositional variables, let Kk = (P’, <‘, 0’, It’) 
be a regular Kripke model so defined: 
_ the root 0’ of P’ = (P’, <‘, 0’) is a prefinal state of I”; 
- 1 Fin( = 2”, where n is the cardinality of o; 
- for every classical interpretation I of the variables of u, there is a final state 4 of P 
such that the forcing It’ of K: on 4 coincides with I for the variables of u. 
With an easy induction on the complexity of A one shows: $ A contains only 
variables of u, then A E WFCL iff 0’ IF’A in the (prejinal) Kripke model 
K:, = (P’, d ‘, 0’, It’) defined above. We recall, on the other hand, the definition of the 
(nonprefinal) model K, = (P, d ,O, II-) immediately before Theorem 16. We have that 
the root of the poset P on which K, is built is a 2”-CEST-canonical state of P (n the 
cardinality of the nonempty set u); moreover, we can assume (without loss of general- 
ity) that K, has the same final states as K:, with the same forcing for the variables of II; 
finally, if A contains only variables of u, then A E E(CEST) iff 0 It A in K,. 
We immediately obtain (up to isomorphisms) that the root 0’ of K: is a prefinal state 
of K, (recall the definition of 2”-CEST-canonical state), hence that K: is a submodel of 
K,,. We therefore have: 
Theorem 17. E(CEST) E WFCL. 
We can also show that any nonstandard constructive logic containing the nonstan- 
dard constructive logic E(EST) (which is a proper sublogic of E(CEST)), is contained 
in WFCL. Moreover, we can find infinitely many constructive logics extending EST, 
which are pairwise constructively incompatible. To give an example, let, for m 3 2, 
L, = EST + {(AS,!,), (AS:, ,)}, where (AS,!,) and (AS:, 1) are the axiom-schemes so 
defined: 
-(AS;): (lA+l& v ... vlB,)+(DE2)‘v(1A-+lB1)v ... v(lA+lB,), 
where (DE,)’ represents an arbitrary instance of the axiom schema (DE,); 
-(AS:+,): ((DE*)‘+ Alv ... vA,vA,+~vA,+~vA m+3)A(/\i=1,...,m+3((Ai 
+ Vi +jAj) + Vi +jAj)) + Al V ... V A, V A,+1 V Am+2 v Am+33 
where (DE,)’ still represents any instance of the axiom schema (DE,) 
(remark that (AS:, 1) is a weakening of Gabbay’s and de Jongh’s axiom- 
schema (D,, 1) [7, 6, 151). 
To characterize the logic L,, let % L, be the class of frames so defined: 
-P=(P, <,O)E%& iff P E %-EST and the two following additional conditions (the 
first related to the axiom-schema (AS:) and the second related to the axiom-schema 
(AS:+ 1)) are satisfied: 
(i) for every ~1, $I~, .. . , & E P such that 2 d k < m, tl is not prefinal, $1, . . . ,& are 
distinct and {41r . . ,&} E Fin(a), there is p E P such that CI < p and 
Fin(B) = {41,...,&}; 
(ii) for every c( E P such that 01 is not prefinal, u has at most m + 2 immediate 
successors. 
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To prove the completeness theorem of the logic L,, the quotient models technique, 
even with extensively complete filtration formulas, does not work. However, one can 
successfully reach the goal using the selective models technique to be explained in the 
second part of the paper (even with arbitrary filtration formulas). From this we prove, 
on the one hand, that, for every m 3 2, L, = _fZ(9~,) and L, is constructive, since 
FL, satisfies (s.d.e.p.) (the proof of the latter fact is not trivial, but can be done as in 
similar cases illustrated in [lS]). On the other hand, combining the properties of 
FL, and FL, (following the lines of similar cases illustrated in [lS]), we obtain that 
L, + L, = dip(FL. n FL,) cannot be extended into a constructive logic for m and 
n such that m > 2, n > 2 and m # n. 
Thus, from the previous discussion and Zorn’s lemma, we get: 
Theorem 18. There are infinitely many maximal nonstandard constructive logics con- 
tained in WFCL. 
We now want to characterize, in terms of Kripke frames semantics, maximal 
constructive logics extending ST and contained in maximal nonstandard constructive 
logics which are, at the same time, maximal constructive pseudologics. To do so, we 
introduce, for every n > 2 and m > 2, the following axiom-schema: 
(T,,,): (1A +lBBlv ... vlB,) + (FIN,)‘v(lA +lB,)v ... v(lA -+1&J, 
where (FIN,,)’ represents any instance of the axiom schema (FIN,,). 
Using the axiom-schemes (T,, ,), the logics EST, and L,,, previously defined, we 
can define the logic CEST, (completed EST,,) as follows: 
- CEST, = EST, + L,,, + Urn > 2{(Tn,m)}. 
The class .9,-asTn for the logic CEST, is defined in the following way, using the 
classes Fnsr, and Fr,.,: 
- P = (P, < , 0) E FCESTn iff P E PEST, n TLaux, and the following property is satis- 
fied: 
(i) for every LX E P such that 1 Fin(a)1 > n, every m 2 2, every distinct +i, . . . ,&,, 
such that {$i, .,. ,&,,} c Fin(a), there is p E P such that CI d fi and 
Fin(B) = {&, . ...&,>. 
Since every Kripke model built on a poset satisfying condition (i) of the above 
definition of YcEsrn is easily seen to satisfy every axiom schema (T,, ,,,) (where n is 
fixed, and m 2 2 is any), combining Propositions 24 and 27 with this fact, we obtain: 
Proposition 38. CEST, E $P(FcEST.). 
Without any additional difficulty with respect o the previous examples of applica- 
tion of the quotient models technique, starting from Theorems 11 and 12 and using 
the axiom-schemes (T,, ,), one can prove the following theorem: 
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Theorem 19. Let n 2 2, let L be any nonstandard logic such that CEST, G L, let F be 
any L-saturated set and let W be any extensively completeformula. Then %‘r.(F)/ = w is 
built on a poset of Y;CEST.. 
Remark. One obtains an equivalent characterization of CEST2 by setting 
CEST2 = EST2 + urn a z{(T~,~)}, i.e., the axiom schemas of the logic L,,, 
are not necessary. Moreover, for every n>2 one can set 
CEST, = EST, + U3 $ i G ,, + I {(Si)) + Urn b 2{(Tn,m)}, i.e., all the axiom schemas 
(Sj) of the logic L,,, such that j > n + 1 are not necessary. 
From Propositions 19 and 38 and Theorems 8 and 19, we get: 
Corollary 9. E(CEST,) = y?,,s(~;cEsr~). 
Combining Propositions 9 and 19 and Theorem 19, we get: 
Corollary 10. For every nonstandard logic L 2 E(CEST,), every L-saturated set F and 
every extensively complete formula W, %YL( F)/ = w is a regular Kripke model built on 
a poset of FCEs~.. 
Now, recalling the notion of m-CEST-almost-canonical state introduced above, we 
inductively define the notion of m-CEST,-almost-canonical state c1 of a poset 
P = (P, < >, for every m 2 1 and every n 3 2: 
(1) If ) Fin(x)\ = m, and m ,< n, and r is a m-CEST-almost-canonical state of P, then 
c( is a m-CEST,-almost-canonical state of P. 
(2) Let crop be such that Fin(ct)={4,,...,4,} and m>n. We say that cx is 
a m-CEST,-almost-canonical state of P iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
~ G[ has exactly m immediate successors /II, . . . , pm in P; 
- for every i, 1 < i < m, Fin(j3i) = {$1, . . . ,&} - (&i} and /Ii is a (m - l)-CEST,- 
almost-canonical state of P. 
Having defined the m-CEST,-almost-canonical states, given a poset P = (P, d > 
and CI E P, we say that tl is a m-CEST,-canonical state of P iff c1 is a m-CEST,-almost- 
canonical state of P (m >, 1 and n B 2) and the following conditions are satisfied: 
-- Let $ be any nonempty subset of Fin(u) and let ( 9 1 = h < m. Then there is a unique 
/I E P such that o! < /?, 9 = Fin(j) and /-I is a h-CEST,-almost-canonical state of P. 
- Let 9 be any nonempty subset of Fin(a) such that 2 < 191 = h < n. Then there is 
a unique y E P such that o! d y, 4 = Fin(y) and y is prefinal in P. 
At this point, we introduce the class F&r. of posets as follows, for every n > 2: 
-.F&sTm={P=(P, <,O)JPisfinite,andOisprefinalinPwithlFin(O)( 6norOis 
a m-CEST,-canonical state of P for some m}. 
To give examples of elements of Y c&sr, for some values of n, consider the poset 
P related to the previous Fig. 1 (P has twenty states and belongs to s&s-,-); then, for 
every n 2 4, P E B&T.. For a more interesting example, let P’ be the poset with 19 
states whose root is immediately followed by the four nonprefinal elements of Fig. 1 
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(i.e., P’ differs from P for the lack of the prefinal state with the four final states 1, 2, 
3 and 4): then P’ E %&sr,. 
Let K = (P, d ,O, IF) and K’ = (P’, < ‘,O’, It’) be two Kripke models such that: 
- P = (P, 6,O) E %cES~. and P’ = (P’, d ‘, 0’) E %&sT.; 
- (Fin(O)P( = 1 Fin(O’)P’l; 
- both 0 and 0’ are prefinal states (of P and P’, respectively), or both 0 and 0’ are not 
prefinal states. 
Let v be any nonempty set of propositional variables. Then we define the notion of 
v-CEST,-canonical application d ofK in K’ just as made in the previous definition of 
v-CEST-canonical application. In other words, a v-CEST,-canonical application of 
K in K’ will be a surjective application d : P -+ P’ which is injective on the set of final 
states of P, sends any prefinal state M of P into the unique prefinal state a’ of P’ whose 
final states are the &‘-images of the final states of a, any nonprefinal state /I of P into the 
unique m-CEST,-canonical state /I’ of P’ whose final states are the I-images of the 
final states of 1, and preserves the forcing of the variables of v. 
As stated for the v-CEST-canonical applications, one proves that, for every regular 
K= (P, <,O,lt) with P= (P, <,O) E%~-sT., there are K’= (P’, <‘,O’,It’) and 
&‘: P ---f P’ such that P’ = (P’, 6’, 0’) E %&ST., P’ is uniquely determined up to 
isomorphisms and d is a u-CEST,-canonical application of K in K’. Also, one has that 
a u-CEST,-canonical application of K in K’ is an open epimorphism of P in I”. Thus, 
since %&sr. E %crsr. trivially holds, along the lines of the proof of Theorem 13 we 
can prove: 
Theorem 20. For every n B 2, E(CEST,) = Y,,,(%&sr.). 
Remark. For a nonstandard logic L 2 QCEST,,), a L-saturated set r and an 
extensively complete formula W, one can directly show that gL(r)/ 3 W is a regular 
Kripke model built on a poset of %&sr.. 
Since 9&r, (as well as %_~asr.) is easily seen to satisfy (s.d.e.p.), we can state: 
Proposition 39. E(CEST,) is a nonstandard constructive logic. 
Now, differently from the case of E(CEST), which is a maximal nonstandard 
constructive logic but is not a maximal constructive pseudologic, we can prove: 
Theorem 21. For every n 2 2, E(CEST,,) is simultaneously a maximal nonstandard 
constructive logic and a maximal constructive pseudologic. 
Proof. Let n > 2. It suffices to show that, for every constructive pseudologic 
L 2 E(CEST,), L = E(CEST,). 
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Assume the contrary. Then there is a wff A such that A E I!. but A$E(CEST,). We 
can take a formula W such that: 
A is a subformula of W; 
W is extensively complete; 
- the cardinality k of the set Y W of the propositional variables of W is such that 
n < 2’. 
Now, we remark that both E(CEST,) and L, being constructive pseudologics, are 
E(CEST,)-saturated sets. Thus, we can consider the two canonical models 
~E,~~,~~,,(E(CEST,)) and % ‘s,c~sr.)(L), the latter being a submodel of the former. 
Let L, = E(CEST,) and L, = L. Consider, for 1 d i d 2, the model 
%EtcEsr_)( Li)/ = w, which is regular by Corollary 10. Since the cardinality of I‘, is k, 
arguing as in the proof of Theorem 14 we can show that the number of final states of 
‘GEtcrsr_)(Li)j E w is 2’. By Corollary IO. the poset Pi = (Pi, d i.Oi) on which 
%c,c.ts~.l( Li)/ = w is built belongs to .Fc~st..; hence, since n < 2k, [he root Oi OfPi is nor 
a prtlfinal state of Pi. 
Let K, =(P,, d,, O,,lb,) and K2 = (P2, 62,02rl~2) be, respectively. 
%E,CFst~j(LI)/- ,+, and %E(c~ST.,(L2)/z ,+,. Since K, and K2 have the same 2’ final 
states with the same forcing, and since their roots are not prefinal states, arguing as in 
the proof of Theorem 14 we obtain that 0, It 1 A (in K,) iflOz It-, A (in K,). This implies 
that A E L1 iff A E L2. Hence, being LI = E(CEST,), L2 = L and A E L, we get 
A E E(CEST,), a contradiction. 0 
To complete the picture of the nonstandard logics E(CEST,), with a proof quite 
similar to the one of Theorem 16, we get: 
Theorem 22. For ecery n 3 2 und fur eoery finite nonempty set c of propositional 
cariahles, E(CEST,)-hiimplication dbides the set offormulas containing only cariahles 
of L’ into a jinitr set of‘equicalence classes. 
Passing from the nonstandard to the standard logics, from Theorems 5 and 21 we 
immediately deduce: 
Corollary 11. For ecery n 2 2. S(E(CEST,)) is a ma.uimal constructive logic. 
TO show that S(E(CEST,)) coincides with Y(.S&sr,), with a proof quite similar to 
the one given above for Theorem 15, we get: 
Theorem 23. Fur euery n 2 2. _Y(.S&sr.) is neg.sat.-determined. 
Corollary 12. For euery n 2 2, S(E(CEST,)) = 9((9&sr.). 
Remarks. (a) The logic S(E(CEST,)) turns out to coincide with Medvedev’s logic 
MV. The proof is almost immediate, looking at the class of posets 3&r, and at the 
Kripke frames semantics of MV given, e.g., in [6, 12, 14, IS]. 
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(b) The proof of the maximality of the logics _Y(F&T,), for every n > 2, provides 
a direct proof, without applications of Zorn’s lemma, i.e., of the axiom of choice, of the 
existence of injkitely many maximal constructive logics. Proofs such as the ones given 
in [2,4], which state the existence of uncountably many maximal constructive logics, 
give a stronger result, but use Zorn’s lemma. 
(c) For every n 3 2, the logic CEST, = U(Y CEsT.) does not coincide with the logic 
S(E(CEST,)) = 9’((9&& As a matter of fact, the axiom-schema (SCHEMA) con- 
sidered above (which belongs to S(E(CEST)) but not to CEST) can be shown to 
belong also to S(E(CEST,)) for every n 2 2, while the instance of its with A = p, 
B = q, C = r, D = s, E = t and F = u does not belong to CEST, for every n b 2 (the 
proofs of these facts are quite similar to the ones given for S(E(CEST)) and CEST)). 
Thus, for the problem of axiomatizing the logic S(E(CEST,)) for any n 2 2, we can 
repeat what has been previously said for S(E(CEST)). 
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